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I. INTRODUCTION
In the fractious realm of antitrust law, one proposition commands
nearly universal allegiance-that antitrust laws protect "competition."1 The various statutes which utilize the term "competition" do
not define it, nor do most courts applying the federal antitrust stat*
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1. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 n.14
(1984); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); Roy B.
Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 779 (1995); Los Angeles Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d
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utes bother to define the term. 2 Nonetheless, at least until the 1970s,
a strong consensus existed among antitrust courts that competition
was to be defined by its dictionary meaning of rivalry among firms for
the business of consumers.3 Rivalry was, in effect, the monarch of antitrust concepts. In the 1970s, however, an opposing definition of
"competition" emerged. Led by judges and commentators belonging to
4
or influenced by the Chicago School of antitrust law and economics,
some courts began defining competition not as rivalry, but as "an allocation of resources in which economic welfare... is maximized."5
The concept that competition equals economic efficiency rather
than rivalry has grown in influence over the past two decades. Many
courts have either explicitly or implicitly rejected the notion that competition is rivalry and have defined competition solely in terms of economic efficiency. 6 This development is so pronounced that one can
fairly conclude that rivalry has been deposed from its regal position in
the realm of antitrust law.
1422, 1427 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1307 (1995); Abcor Corp. v. AM
Intl, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 931 (4th Cir. 1990).
2. STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCiPLEs OF ANTITRUST LAw 124 (1992); 1 SECTION OF ANTI-

TRUST LAw, Am.BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 42-43 (3d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter ANTrrRusT DEVELOPENTS]; Sam D. Johnson & A. Michael Ferrill,

Defining Competition: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Decision Making, 36
BAYLOR L. REV. 583, 585-87 (1984).

3. See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 89 (1912); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945); Commonwealth

Edison Co. v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 40 F.R.D. 96, 102 (E.D. Ill. 1966); United
States v. Koppers Co., 202 F. Supp. 437, 446-47 (W.D. Pa. 1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 856 (1962); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F. Supp.
576, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See infra note 7.
4. The Chicago School of antitrust law and economics emphasizes that allocative
efficiency (or, perhaps more accurately, avoiding artificial reductions in output) is
the only legitimate goal of the antitrust laws and that neoclassical microeconomic
theory (with its assumptions of rational, profit-maximizing producers and consumers, the free mobility of capital and labor, relatively free entry into and exit
from markets, and the inability of producers who do not possess market power to
restrict output or raise prices) is the exclusive source of knowledge on whether an
act or practice can reduce output. For an overview of the Chicago School of
thought, see generally HERBERT HOvENKAmp, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAw OF COMPETITION AND rrs PRACTICE 61-71 (1994); Richard A. Posner, The Chi-

cago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979). See also Walter
Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of Economic
Theory, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 257, 282-93 (1995) (describing Chicago School principles under the rubric of "revisionist antitrust vision").
5. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984). See also
General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Rental Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588,
596 (7th Cir. 1984)("the allocation of resources that maximizes consumer
welfare").
6. See infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
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It is time to restore rivalry to the throne and reestablish it as a
central concept in antitrust law. Defining competition in terms of rivalry is both sound law and sound economics. Rivalry as competition
is sound law because principles of statutory interpretation imply that
competition means rivalry when that term or concept is utilized in the
antitrust statutes. Rivalry as competition is sound economics because
contemporary studies indicate that promoting rivalry will increase the
internal efficiency of firms, spur innovation, and help develop worldclass competitive industries. These developments will, in turn, enhance (or to use Judge Posner's term "maximize") the economic efficiency which the members of the Chicago School and their fellow
travelers hold so dear.
Rivalry cannot, however, be restored to prominence under the
same terms and conditions which prevailed before it was displaced. A
restored rivalry standard must avoid the past excesses (which, in part,
may have been responsible for its ouster) and must accommodate itself to new political realities. First, not every injury to rivals should
automatically be equated with an injury to rivalry. Second, not every
minor or de minimis injury to rivalry itself should give rise to a cause
of action under the federal antitrust laws. Third, those who emphasize the centrality of rivalry in the antitrust laws cannot ignore efficiency concerns, even when such concerns do not necessarily enhance
rivalry.
Part II of this Article is devoted to an exploration of why, as a matter of statutory interpretation, competition under the antitrust laws
should be defined as rivalry. Part III of the Article discusses why focusing the antitrust laws on the rivalry standard will lead to increases
in productive and innovative efficiency which are so necessary for
long-term success in an increasingly globalized and technologically
driven economy.
Part IV of this Article contains a discussion of some of the changes
in modern antitrust doctrine which will be wrought by a renewed focus on using the antitrust laws to promote rivalry. Finally, Part V of
the Article will discuss the doctrinal changes and accommodations
which must be made if rivalry is to remain a viable central organizing
concept in antitrust law.
II. WHY COMPETITION MEANS RIVALRY UNDER THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
Those who claim that competition under the antitrust laws means
something other than rivalry have a heavy burden of proof to bear.
First, the dictionary definitions of competition all equate competition
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with rivalry. 7 However, as Professor Kaplow points out, this does not
decide the issue.8 But, as he also points out, none of the dictionary
definitions contemplate economic efficiency as a meaning of
competition. 9
Second, competition is defined as rivalry in common usage.lO The
tendency to equate rivalry with competition is so strong that even
Judge Frank Easterbrook, a vigorous proponent of defining competition as efficiency, cannot avoid the tendency. In his dissenting opinion
in Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz,"1 Judge Easterbrook made the point
that competition is efficiency, not "moment to moment rivalry."12 Yet,
in the very next sentence of his opinion Judge Easterbrook writes that
"[r]eal competition is bruising rivalry."13 Such is the tenacity of competition as rivalry in common usage.14
Third, and perhaps most important, for eighty years courts either
explicitly or implicitly defined competition under the antitrust laws as
rivalry.35 Eighty years of consistent definitional precedent should not
be overturned without a compelling reason, and no such compelling
reason exists.
Nothing in the legislative history of any of the federal antitrust
laws compels the conclusion that competition ought to mean economic
efficiency rather than rivalry. However, this is not a ringing declaration that the legislative history of the Sherman Antitrust Act (or the
other federal antitrust acts which, unlike the Sherman Act, actually
use the term "competition" in their texts) requires that competition be
defined in terms of rivalry. No such categorical declaration can be
made for two reasons. First, an examination of the legislative history
of the antitrust laws, particularly the Sherman Act, reveals that the
individual members of Congress who passed the statute (a) had a variety of goals which they believed the statute would promote, and (b)
7. The first definition of "competition" in Webster's Third International Dictionary
is "rivalry." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 464 (Philip Babcock Grove & Merriam Webster eds.,

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

1971). The Oxford English Dictionary and the Random House Dictionary are
both in accord. 3 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY 604 (2d ed. 1989); Tm RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DIcTIoNARY 417 (2d ed. 1993).
Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & Economics and the Courts, 50 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 181, 210 (1987).
Id.
Id.
807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986)(Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
Id. at 576 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
Id. at 577 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)(emphasis added).
In light of the dictionary definition of competition as rivalry and the prevalence of
that definition in common usage, one can only view the claim of Robert Bork, that
defining competition as economic efficiency is "consistent with everyday speech,"
ROBERT H. BORK, TIE ANTrrRUST PARADox 61 (1978), as either incredibly disin-

genuous or intellectually dishonest.
15. See supra note 3.
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operated in an intellectual milieu in which the term "competition" had
no completely clear and singular meaning. Second, even if we could
somehow ascertain the intent of the Congress in passing the Sherman
Act, it is not clear that such an intent ought to be a definitive road
map on how to interpret that statute.
Despite the lack of clear authority in this area, there is some evidence in the legislative history of the Sherman Act that Congress intended competition to mean rivalry. The preservation of "competition"
was one of the concerns voiced by Senator Sherman and others in the
course of the debates over the bills that were to become the Sherman
Act.16 However, none of the speakers formally defined "competition."17 Nonetheless, the speakers appeared to be using the term
"competition" to mean "'rivalry,' or the presence of multiple sellers in a
market."Is This, of course, supports the notion that competition under
the antitrust laws means rivalry.
On the other hand, at least some of the legislators who voted for
the Sherman Act believed, or at least insinuated, that they were
merely codifying common law prohibitions against restraints of trade
in passing the Act.19 The common law at the time permitted a
number of restraints of trade which clearly destroyed rivalry. For example, price-fixing agreements among tradespeople were routinely
tolerated as long as they did not involve the coercion of unwilling par16. E.g., 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); 21 CONG. Rtc.
5957 (1890) (statement of Rep. Stewart); 21 CONG. REC. 5957 (1890)(statement of
Rep. Anderson).

17. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust'sProtected Classes, 88 MicH. L. REv. 1, 23 (1989).
18. Id. For example, Senator George of Mississippi indicated that competition was
the act of sellers striving to sell the same article to the same customers. 21 CONG.
REc. 1767 (1890) (statement of Sen. George). This, of course, closely parallels the
definition of rivalry as a quest for the business of the same customers. Senator
Platt similarly seemed to believe competition was rivalry when he analogized
competition to "brutal" warfare among men. 21 CONG. REc. 2729 (1890) (statement of Sen. Platt). Again, the analogy smacks of rivalry as the implicit definition of competition.
19. See generally Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the
Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REv. 263, 278-81 (1986)(describing the
legislative history of the Sherman Act) and sources cited therein. The great judicial champion of the view that Congress was merely codifying the common law
doctrine of restraints of trade in passing the Sherman Act was Justice Holmes.
See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 404 (1904)(Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes would not, however, have dissented from the opinion that competition equals rivalry. In Holmes' view, the Sherman Act did not protect
competition. It barred restraints of trade. As Holmes stated, "[tihe [Sherman]
[A]ct says nothing about competition." Id. at 403 (Holmes, J., dissenting). For an
analysis of Holmes' views on this point, and on antitrust law in general, see Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Philosophy of Justice Holmes, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J.
283 (1994).
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ticipants to join the agreement. 20 Indeed, in the years immediately
following the passage of the Sherman Act some federal courts actually
allowed price-fixing agreements to pass muster under Section One of
the Sherman Act because they did not involve coercion directed at
third parties. 2 1 This is hardly consistent with an exclusive focus on
rivalry, and therefore competition, as the essence of the Sherman Act.
Moreover, some of the legislators who passed the Sherman Act did
not think in terms of pure "competition," but thought and spoke in
terms of "fair competition."22 The concept of "fair competition" encompassed the notion that a tradesperson was entitled to a "fair" return
for his efforts, even if generating such a fair return required the abatement or even abolition of rivalry with other tradespeople. 2 3 This conceptualization of "fair competition" is inconsistent with a
straightforward equivalency between competition and rivalry because
it suggests that rivalry can be suspended or annulled in order to attain "fair competition."
In addition to the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the intellectual climate of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century also tends to indicate that Congress wished to protect rivalry to
the extent it sought to protect competition. "Nineteenth century economic writers in general ...concentrated heavily on horizontal rivalry
when they spoke of competition."2 4 Indeed many opponents and crit20. Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiraciesin American Law: 1880-1930, 66 Tax.
L. Rav. 919, 932-34 (1988). While a few decisions upheld the de jure legality of
price-fixing arrangements, most gave them de facto legality by holding that while
they could not be enforced against members of the cartel, they could not be challenged by third parties or the state. Id. at 932. Professor Arthur has argued that
under American (as opposed to English) common law, price-fixing cartels were de
facto illegal because their inability to be enforced in a court of law rendered pricefixing agreements ineffectual, forcing cartel members to form trusts to enforce
their price understandings. Arthur, supra note 19, at 282-83.
21. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition,
74 IOWA L. Rav. 1019, 1034-35 (1989)(citing United States v. Greenhut (In re
Corning), 51 F. 205 (N.D. Pa. 1892); United States v. Greenhut (In re Terrell), 51
F. 213 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892); In re Greene, 52 F. 104 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892)). Section One of the Sherman Act bars 'every contract, combination... or conspiracy"
in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
22. Rudolph J. Peritz, A CounterHistory of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 266
(citing 21 CONG. REc. 2730 (1890)(remarks of Sen. Platt)). See also 21 CONG. Eec.
2461 (1890)(remarks of Sen. Sherman); 21 CONG. IEc. 3151 (1890)(remarks of
Sen. Edmunds) (both speaking in terms of 'fair competition").
23. Peritz, supra note 22, at 266. But see Edwin S. Hughes, The Left Side of Antitrust: What FairnessMeans, 77 MARQ. L. Rav. 265, 297-99 (1994)(enunciating
concept of "fair competition" with more emphasis on process and linkage between
superior efforts and rewards for those efforts than a guaranteed result of "fair"
profit).
24. James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Politicaland Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OMO ST. L.J. 257, 395
(1989)(emphasis added).

1996]

RESTORING RIVALRY TO ANTITRUST

ics of competition in general, and the new federal antitrust law in particular, implicitly assumed that competition meant rivalry.25
Once again, however, an examination of the intellectual milieu of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries does not totally support the notion that competition necessarily equals rivalry. First, the
concept of competition may have been inextricably bound to notions of
property rights and fair competition. 26 This union suggests that competition had meaning only in the context of property rights, including
the right to make contracts. 27 The right to make contracts included
the right to voluntarily agree not to engage in rivalry (at least on
items that were not "prime necessities").28 Additionally, the concept
of fair competition encompassed a right of fair return on one's property or efforts. The right to a fair return implicitly included a right to
reduce or eliminate rivalry where that state of affairs infringed upon
the right to a fair return.
Second, by the turn of the nineteenth century at least some economic writers were beginning to break away from a definition of competition that was rooted in the concept of rivalry. These writers began
to define competition in terms of end results or prevailing conditions
rather than in terms of rivalry.29 This conceptualization is, perhaps,
analogous to the notion that rivalry equals economic efficiency, especially the variety of economic efficiency known as allocative efficiency.
Allocative efficiency is an allocation of resources in which the market
including a normal reprice of goods and the cost of their 3production,
turn on capital, are roughly equal. 0
142-44 (1900)(critic of the
Sherman Act claiming that competition is the opposite of agreement among producers); James Logan, Unintelligent Competition a Large Factor in Making Industrial Concentration a Necessity, 172 N. Am.REv. 686, 688-89 (1901)(critic of
Sherman Act analogizing competition to industrial warfare); John B. Clark, The
Limits of Competition, 2 PoL. Scr. Q. 45, 50 (1887)(critic of anti-monopoly laws
defining competition as effort to undersell rival); ArmmR J. EDDY, TnE NEW Com.
PErrON21 (4th ed. 1915)(critic of "cutthroat competition" equating competition
with rivalry). On the views of contemporary critics of the Sherman Act, see generally HANs B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTruST POLICY 122-27, 311-18 (1954);
3 JosEPH DoRF AN, THE EcoNornc Mnmw iN AsmancAN CvILIzATION 119-20, 30911, 315 (1949).
See Rudolph J. Peritz, The "Rule ofReason" in Antitrust Law: PropertyLogic in
Restraintof Competition, 40 HASTnqGS L.J. 285, 303-13 (1989). See also Waller,
supra note 19, at 289-91 (describing Justice Holmes' view of the common law
meaning of the Sherman Act in similar terms).
Peritz, supra note 26, at 338.
Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 1030.
See infra notes 35-36.
CHmSTOPHER PAss & BYRON LowEs, Busn-mss AND MCROECoNoMncs 14 (1994).
Chicago School antitrust theorists tend to use allocative efficiency in a somewhat
different sense. They tend to view allocative efficiency as a state in which society's resources are employed in the uses upon which consumers collectively place

25. See, e.g., RIcHARD T. ELY, MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS

26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
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Thus, neither the legislative history of the Sherman Act, nor the
intellectual context that existed at the time of its enactment unequivocally support the idea that competition meant rivalry. Nonetheless,
the legislative history of the Sherman Act and the milieu of the time
in which it was enacted do lend fairly strong support to the equation
between competition and rivalry. More important, those factors do
not support the view that competition ought to be defined in terms of
economic efficiency.
Another possible argument for efficiency supplanting rivalry as the
definition of competition is that competition is an economic concept,
and therefore, if economists define competition in terms of economic

efficiency, the law should follow suit.3 1 Regardless of the legal merits

of this argument, it does not justify defining competition as efficiency
because no consensus exists among economists that competition
should be defined in terms of economic efficiency. Many economists
view rivalry as synonymous with competition.3 2 Indeed, the earliest
and most elemental economic definition of competition is rivalry.3 3
The widespread use among economists of rivalry as a synonym for
competition led Professor Kaplow to conclude that rivalry was "the"
economic definition of competition.3 4
Unfortunately, among economists the tendency to draw a sharp
distinction between rivalry and competition is much stronger than
Professor Kaplow admits. As early as the first half of the nineteenth
century, at least some economists viewed competition not as rivalry,
but as an economic climate which enabled actors to attain certain eco-

31.

32.

33.
34.

the highest value. Adams & Brock, supra note 4, at 284 (citing Bom, supra note
14, at 91).
Professors Areeda and Turner make a somewhat similar argument in attempting
to dismiss the populist noneconomic goals evident in the legislative history of the
1950 Cellar-Kefauver Act, Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, which
amended Section Seven of the Clayton Act. Section Seven of the Clayton Act, as
amended by the Cellar-Kefauver Act, forbids mergers or acquisitions "in any line
of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country,
[where] the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). Areeda and Turner note
that the legislation which was ultimately enacted used the term "competition"
and that this term was an economic concept with an economic meaning. 4 pHn.
LIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTrIruST LAw %904, at 13 (1980).
PASS & Lowas, supra note 30, at 129; CHmuSnE AimaxR & DEAN S. Azi, DicTiONARY OF Busmnss AND EcoNoMIcs 91 (1984); TERRY Bunca ET AL., ComEnTIoN IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (1988). See also SHARoN M. OSTER, MODERN
Cowi
rnr ANALYsIs 203 (1990)(implicit equation of rivalry with competition).
George J. Stigler, Competition, in 1 THm NEw PALGRAVE DICnoNARY oF EcoNoMics 531 (John Eatwell et al., eds., 1987).
Kaplow, supra note 8.
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nomic goals.3 5 These views can be seen as precursors to the later arguments that competition should be defined in terms of an outcome,
efficiency maximization, rather than a process, rivalry.
By the mid-twentieth century many other economists began to
equate competition with the economic model of perfect competition
and began to view the former as existing when markets behaved as if
they were perfectly competitive. 3 6 Again, this could be taken as an
endorsement of the idea that competition is maximization of economic
efficiency rather than rivalry. Indeed, by 1946, before the rise of the
modern Chicago School of antitrust law and economics, University of
Chicago economist Frank H. Knight explicitly denied competition was
a form of rivalry. Knight wrote that:
The meaning of "competition" is that [actors in the market] are numerous and
act individually; "atomistic" is a better word. There is no presumption of psychological competition, emulation or rivalry as this is rather contrary to the
definition of economic behavior. Market relations are impersonal 37between
persons and goods; and persuasion or "bargaining" is also excluded.

Today, as economists F.M. Scherer and David Ross (neither of
whom is particularly sympathetic to the Chicago School of antitrust
law and economics) point out, economists generally draw a sharp distinction between the businessperson's concept of competition, i.e., rivalry, and the economist's concept of competition, a market which
conforms to the model of perfect competition. 38 However, even if one
believes that many modern economists do distinguish between rivalry
and competition, that belief still does not justify substituting economic
efficiency for rivalry as the legal definition of competition.
First, competition, as it is used in the antitrust laws, is a legal concept, not an economic concept. The concept is utilized in statutes
passed by legislators who likely recognized the business and ordinary
person's concept of competition as rivalry rather than an economic
35. AUGUSTIN CoRNoT, MATHE ATIcAL PRINCIPLEs OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 58-73
(1995)(originally published in 1838); NAssAu W. SENIOR, AN OuTLnm OF THE SciENCE OF PoLricAL EcONOmy 102 (1836).

36. George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL.
EcoN. 1, 10-17 (1957). A perfectly competitive market possesses these character-

istics: (1) "each firm is so small relative to the market that it can exert no perceptible influence on price" (2) "all sellers must sell identical products"; (3) "there is
free mobility of all resources, including free entry and exit of firms into and out of

the industry"; and (4) "all buyers and sellers in the market possess complete and
perfect knowledge." JAE K. SHIM & JOEL G. SIEGEL, DICIoNARY OF EcONOincs
266 (1995).
37. Frank H. Knight, New Frontiersin Economic Thought, 36 A4m. Eco. REv. 91, 102
(1946)(emphasis added).
38. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INmusTRIAL MARimT STRucTucJ
PERFOIMANCE

15-16 (3d ed. 1990). See also

AND EcONOMIc
REUVEN BRENNER, RIVALRY 47-48

(1987)(noting the divergence between the businessperson's concept of competition
as rivalry and the economist's concept of competition as an economic climate).
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concept of competition as a mimic of the theory of perfect competition.
Thus, the legislators intended competition to mean rivalry.
Second, many economists do still equate competition with rivalry.39 Given this fact, the fairest statement that can be made is that
no consensus exists among economists as to the exact definition of
competition. 40 Such an uncertain proposition hardly justifies overturning eight decades of legal precedent by substituting economic efficiency for rivalry as the legal definition of competition.
Finally, even if economists widely agreed that competition is not
rivalry, that agreement would not justify using economic efficiency as
the definition of competition. Economists regard competition and the
various forms of economic efficiency as distinct concepts. 4 1 Hence,
whatever competition means in economic theory, that theory does not
justify making any form of economic efficiency synonymous with the
concept of competition.
Perhaps the strongest attack on equating competition with rivalry
is that the equation is somehow "illogical." This attack has been expressly launched by Robert H. Bork. Bork argues that competition
cannot be given its "natural" meaning of rivalry for two reasons.
First, Bork claims that if competition were defined as rivalry, the antitrust laws would forbid all acts and practices which eliminate rivalry,
42
a result Bork finds "unthinkable" and "economically disastrous."
Bork apocalyptically predicts that if rivalry were to be equated with
competition, all 'Tmn[s],... partnership[s],... corporation[s] ... [and]
economic unit[s] containing more than a single person" could not survive scrutiny under the antitrust laws because the creation of such
43
entities eliminates "some kinds of rivalry between persons."
Second, Bork objects that defining competition as rivalry makes rivalry an end in itself which must be preserved "no matter how many
and how large the benefits flowing from the elimination of rivalry."44
Bork is, in essence, arguing that rivalry is not a proper object for antitrust legislation because it is a means rather than an end.
Bork's first objection has a degree of surface credibility. A closer
examination of the objection reveals, however, that Bork is attacking a
straw man. The argument assumes that if competition is defined as
rivalry, no other values or arguments may be considered in deciding
39. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
40. Paul J. McNulty, The Economic Meaning of Competition, 82 Q.J. ECON. 639, 639
(1968). The lack of precision in the definition of competition is not a new phenomenon. In the late nineteenth century, American political economist John B. Clark
complained that many writers did not define the term "competition" when they
used it. Clark, supra note 25.
41. Kaplow, supra note 8.
42. Bomc, supra note 14, at 58-59.
43. Id. at 58.

44. Id.
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the legality of an act or practice under the antitrust laws. This assumption is simply contrary to logic and fact. Nothing prevents courts
from considering values other than rivalry. Indeed, some forms of economic efficiency have gained parity with, and in many instances dominance over, rivalry.45 Even nonrivalrous, noneconomic efficiency
considerations have occasionally triumphed in the antitrust context,
despite statements by the Supreme Court and lower courts that the
antitrust laws are solely concerned with competition. 4 6
The argument also assumes that if competition is equated with rivalry, only the immediate impact of a practice on moment-to-moment
rivalry will be considered by a court, while long term or more generalized impact on rivalry will be ignored. This assumption is also erroneous. Contrary to Bork's claims, equating rivalry with competition
would not lead to the illegality of all economic units of more than one
person. While it is true that the formation of such units automatically
decreases the rivalry among the individuals making up the unit, the
ability to form such units may increase rivalry in the entire market by
allowing individuals already in the market to be effective rivals, or by
encouraging other individuals to enter the market and to become
rivals.
Bork's own example of a monomaniacal devotion to rivalry contradicts his apocalyptic predictions and indicates that an antitrust court
can look at rivalry in a broader perspective. Bork cites Justice Clark's
dissent in White Motor Co. v. United States47 as an example of a single-minded and inappropriate enshrinement of rivalry. The case in45. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing,
472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985)(suggesting that injury to competition can be offset by
gains in efficiency); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979)(suggesting that increase in economic efficiency is a "procompetitive effect"); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 229
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987)(restraint on trade justified by
efficiency of eliminating free-riding); The Five Smiths v. National Football
League Players Ass'n, 788 F. Supp. 1042, 1055 (D. Minn. 1992)(increase in economic efficiency is a "procompetitive effect").
46. Compare FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986); National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-91, 694-95 (1978);
COMPACT v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 594 F. Supp. 1567, 1577 (M.D.
Tenn. 1984); United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149
(D.D.C. 1982)(all denying that non-competitive values are relevant in Rule of
Reason analysis) with Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
55 n.23 (1977)(dictum)(product safety as justification in Rule of Reason analysis);
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993)(spreading educational
opportunity to needy students as justification in Rule of Reason analysis); Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 316-17 (6th Cir.
1989)(need to countervail powerful film distributors as justification in Rule of
Reason analysis); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984)(quality of care of medical patients allowed to override anticompetitive effects).
47. 372 U.S. 253 (1963)(Clark, J., dissenting).
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volved an antitrust attack upon vertical non-price restraints.48 In
reversing the grant of summary judgement for the government, the
Court refused to hold that such restraints were per se illegal.49 Justice Clark dissented and argued that "[tlo admit, as does the petitioner
[White Motor Company], that competition is eliminated under its contracts is, under our cases, to admit a violation of the Sherman Act. No
justification, no matter how beneficial, can save it from that
interdiction."5 0
Just four years later, the Court reversed its position and held vertical territorial restraints to be per se illegal in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.51 Schwinn itself was overruled in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.5 2 In Sylvania, the Court held that vertical
non-price restraints were to be judged under the Rule of Reason.53 It
gave these restraints Rule of Reason treatment in part because it was
convinced that such restraints could lead to enhanced interbrand competition/rivalry which would more than offset any injuries they might
cause to intrabrand competition/rivalry.54 The Court looked at overall
competition/rivalry and was not blinded by the immediate impact of
the challenged restraints on one particular form of rivalry. This
shows that the Court is willing to accept a more general definition of
rivalry rather than the narrow and restrictive formulation criticized
by Bork.
Bork's second reason for challenging the equation between competition and rivalry--that rivalry is a means, not an end, and therefore
is not a fit object of a statute-is equally vacuous. Bork seems to be
saying that Congress could not possibly have made a means the objective of a statute. This view is only sustainable if one of the following
assumptions is accepted:
(a) Congress never chooses means rather than ends as objects of statutes, or
(b) Rivalry is an irrational means of attaining what Congress believed the
ends of the antitrust laws to be, and Congress never chooses an inappropriate means to attain a statutory objective.
48. Vertical restraints of trade are restraints of trade between "firms at different
levels within the chain of distribution-between, for example, a manufacturer
and a wholesaler, or a wholesaler and a retailer" and "frequently are designed to
limit the conditions under which firms may resell products or the conditions
under which customers may purchase products." ANTrrUST DxwLoPrMNrs,
supra note 2, at 99-100 (footnote omitted). Nonprice restraints are agreements
which do not establish a resale price or price ranges of products or services. Cf
id.at 100 (defining vertical price restrictions).
49. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263-64 (1963).
50. Id. at 281 (Clark, J., dissenting), cited in BoPic, supra note 14, at 58.
51. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
52. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
53. Id. at 59. Under the Rule of Reason, a restraint of trade will violate Section One
of the Sherman Act if its anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive effects. See infra note 149.
54. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55-57 (1977).
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Both propositions are ludicrous.
Congress routinely enacts legislation with the objective of creating
a means to a greater end. One example is tax subsidies to encourage
investment. From 1962 to 1986, Congress gave favorable tax treatment to entities that made certain investments in plant and equipment.5 5 Congress wished to encourage those investments. The
making of investments was not, however, an end in and of itself. If all
that had occurred was increased investment without further effects,
Congress would not have been particularly pleased. Increased investments in plant and equipment were but a means to attaining the ends
of enhanced economic growth, productivity, international economic
6
competitiveness, and increased employment.5
The proposition that rivalry is irrational and could not have been
intended by Congress is equally absurd. First, as will be demonstrated in Part III of this Article, the promotion of rivalry is a quite
suitable method for promoting economic growth and efficiency. Second, even if this were not true, it does not mean that Congress did not
choose the promotion of rivalry as the object of the antitrust laws.
When drafting legislation, Congress sometimes chooses means
which do not necessarily promote the ends it has in mind. Take, for
example, the portion of the 1938 Federal Wage and Hours statute that
requires some workers to be paid time and a half for overtime work.57
Increased pay for overtime was not the goal of the statute. Instead,
the regulations were meant to increase employment opportunities and
to decrease hours of work.58 Ironically, however, by creating an incentive for overtime work on the part of workers, the act may have decreased both employment and leisure time for workers.59
The proposition that Congress would not choose an inappropriate
means to an end should be especially implausible to conservative
political thinkers and devotees of neoclassical economics such as Bork.
For more than two hundred years one of the staples of conservative
political rhetoric has been the claim that liberal social legislation will
often cause effects exactly opposite from those which its proponents
hope to create.6 0 Thinkers in this tradition can hardly argue that
55. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834 § 2, 76 Stat. 960, 963-66 (1962) (repealed
by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 211, 100 Stat. 2085, 2166-70

(1986)).
56. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962)(reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3304, 3313-14).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1988).
58. JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED MERICAN 141 (1991).

59. Id.
60. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHmAN, THE RHETORIC OF REAGTION 11-42 (1991) (Hirschman

terms this the "perversity thesis."). One of the examples cited by Professor
Hirschman is the claim by Milton Friedman, a Nobel prize winning neoclassical
economist and one of the founders of the Chicago School of economics, that mini-
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Congress would not enact a statute whose ends could not be attained
by the means it chose.
In summary, legislative history, economic usage, and logic do not
support overturning dictionary meaning, common usage, and eight decades of court precedent, all of which define competition as rivalry.
Those who urge that the sole goal of the antitrust laws is the promotion of economic efficiency would be better off if they stopped trying to
define competition in terms of economic efficiency and admitted that
competition should not be protected at all.61 In effect, they should admit that in their zeal to avoid protecting competitors, they wrongly
embraced the nostrum
that the antitrust laws protect "competition,
62
not competitors."
The proponents of economic efficiency can justify their change of
heart on one of two bases. They could claim that the antitrust laws
were never meant to protect competition and were always meant to
protect economic efficiency. The problem with this approach is that it
ignores much legislative history 63 and more than a century of language in judicial decisions stating that antitrust laws do indeed protect competition. 6 4
Alternatively, economic efficiency proponents could admit that the
antitrust laws perhaps were originally meant to protect competition,
but that they are analagous to constitutional provisions. As such, the
antitrust laws are designed to be developed by and to evolve through
judicial interpretation. Under this approach, rejecting the idea that
the antitrust laws protect competition could be justified on the basis
that "advances" in our knowledge of economics now indicate that promoting competition will no longer foster overall economic welfare.
mum wage laws make wages fall rather than rise. Id. at 27-28 (citing MLTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 180 (1962)).

61. A possible variant of this approach is to argue that injury to competition is not
enough to establish a violation of the antitrust laws and that any successful challenge to an act or practice under the antitrust laws must include a demonstration
that output or economic efficiency has been injured. A panel of the Ninth Circuit
recently took this approach. In Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d

1421 (9th Cir. 1995), the court admitted that competition equaled rivalry among
competitors. Id. at 1433. Then, however, the court went on to say that injury to
competition alone was not enough to establish a violation of the antitrust laws.
The court held that an injury to "consumer welfare," defined in terms of an injury
to allocative efficiency, must also be proven. Id.
62. The phrase was introduced into antitrust cases by the Warren Court in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). The Warren Court's antitrust jurisprudence is held in disdain by most Chicago antitrust theorists.
63. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
64. In addition to the many early cases which stressed that the antitrust laws protect
competition, see supra note 1, innumerable modern courts, including courts influenced by the Chicago School of antitrust law and economics and the Supreme
Court, have embraced the notion that the antitrust laws protect competition, not
competitors. Id.
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This argument may be difficult for a few microeconomically-oriented
antitrust theorists to accept because they strongly advocate interpreting the antitrust laws in accordance with the bare statutes, or perhaps
the original intent of the legislators who enacted the antitrust laws. 65
On the other hand, many other Chicago School or microeconomicallyoriented antitrust theoreticians are more inclined to accept this argument. 6 6 The problem, however, is that the argument's basic premise
is wrong. As will be demonstrated in Part III of this Article, contemporary economic studies indicate that promoting rivalry is absolutely
crucial to the attainment of economic efficiency and a nation's economic well-being.
III. WHY PROMOTING RIVALRY ALSO PROMOTES
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, INNOVATION, AND
WORLD-CLASS COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES
A. Rivalry and the Elimination of X-Inefficiencies
The traditional and simplest argument for how rivalry promotes
economic efficiency is that rivalry forces firms to be internally efficient.67 As Learned Hand wrote a half century ago, "immunity from
65. The idea of relying on some type of original legislative intent most strongly influences Robert Bork in his ultimately unconvincing attempts to prove that the Congress in 1890 intended the Sherman Act solely to promote allocative efficiency.
See Bork, supra note 14, at 61-66. The bare meaning advocates can trace their
lineage back to Justice Holmes who insisted that the Sherman Act had nothing to
do with competition, but merely codified the common law of restraints of trade
into federal statutory law. See supra note 19. The strongest contemporary advocate of this view is Professor Arthur. See Arthur, supra note 19; Thomas C. Arthur, WorkableAntitrust Law: The StatutoryApproach to Antitrust Law, 62 TuL.
L. REv. 1163 (1988). Professor Arthur might object to this Article's characterization of him as "microeconomically oriented." However, in his proposal on interpreting the antitrust laws, a vital distinction is made between legal restraints of
trade which are ancillary to legitimate business purposes and illegal restraints,
i.e., those which are naked or not reasonably necessary to further the legitimate
end. Arthur, supra note 19, at 337-40. Professor Arthur proposes the use of neoclassical microeconomic theory to make this crucial distinction. Id. at 341. Thus,
he can be fairly characterized as "microeconomically oriented" even though he
criticizes many Chicago School theorists in his articles.
66. Cf. Ricmizw POSNER, THE FEDERAL CounTs 288 (1985)(leading Chicago School

theorist suggesting that the common law nature of antitrust statutes allows
judges to ignore the values that the Congress meant to further in passing the
antitrust laws). See also Arthur, supra note 19, at 267-68 n.9 (suggesting that
both traditionalist and Chicago Schools of antitrust analysis have generally accepted the notion that the antitrust laws are of an evolutionary constitutional
nature); Hughes, supranote 23, at 275-76 (arguing that most Chicago School theorists have abandoned any claim that the efficiency-centered view of antitrust
law is grounded in legislative intent).
67. In economic terms, this is known as productive efficiency- obtaining the greatest
amount of output from the least amount of input. PAss & Lowss, supra note 30;
WALTER ADAhis & JAMEs BROCK, THE BIGNEss ComPLx 33 (1986).
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competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an
inevitable disposition to let well enough alone."6s To translate Judge
Hand's observation into modern economic terms, pressures created by
69
rivalry force firms to eliminate internal X-inefficiencies.
X-inefficiency is a "type of inefficiency which is manifest as excess
unit costs of production among firms sheltered from competitive pressure."70 The argument that the antitrust laws should protect rivalry
because rivalry helps reduce X-inefficiencies rests on three
assumptions:
(1) X-inefficiencies exist;
(2) X-inefficiencies are economically significant; and
(3) Competitive pressures, in the form of rivalry, will help reduce Xinefficiencies.

If any of these premises is inaccurate, then the traditional view that
rivalry is a tonic which helps the economy by pressuring firms to eliminate internal productive inefficiencies cannot be sustained. Each of
these premises will, therefore, be evaluated.
First, x-inefficiencies do indeed exist. Numerous empirical studies
indicate that firms and other organizations suffer from X-inefficiencies
that are often severe. 7 1 The finding that firms may be operating at
less than maximum efficiency, or not minimizing their costs, runs
counter to a basic operating assumption of modern neoclassical economics-firms always seek to maximize their profits by maximizing
output for a given input and by minimizing costs for a given output
rate. 7 2 Not surprisingly, the observation that X-efficiencies exist has
drawn criticism from adherents to the traditional neoclassical view.
Most of these critics have attacked the existence of X-inefficiency on a
purely theoretical basis and without resort to prediction and testable
hypothesis. The theoretical criticisms of the existence of X-inefficiency
generally run along one of the following lines:
68. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945). The
relationship between competition and internal productive efficiency was noted
more than two centuries ago by Adam Smith who wrote that "[m]onopoly... is a
great enemy to good management, which can never be universally established
but in consequence of that free and universal competition which forces everybody
to have recourse to it for the sake of self-defense." ADAM SMrIr, AN INQuiRY INTO
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 147 (Edwin Cannan ed.,
1937).
69. Cf. Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020, 1028 n.36
(1987)(noting the linkage between Judge Hand's language and the modem concept of X-inefficiency).
70. ROGER S. FRANTz, X-EmFcimNcY: THEORY, EVmENCE AND APPLICATIONs 2-3
(1988). The opposite of X-inefficiency is X-efficiency. Id. at 2.
71. For a summary of these and other studies, see FRArz, supra note 70, at 117-61.
72. PAss & LowEs, supra note 30, at 55-56; ARTHUR A. THOMPSON, JR. & JOHN P.
FoRMBy, EcONOMIcs OF THE FnRm 248 (6th ed. 1993).
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(a) What appear to be X-inefficiencies are really
7 3 rational profit-maximizing
exercises in economic rent seeking by firms.
(b) What appear to be X-inefficiencies are merely the results of choices by the
employees to maximize their utility by producing leisure rather than commodities sold in the market. 74
(c) Competitive capital markets will compel managers of firms to be X-efficient in order to avoid takeovers of their firms. 75
(d) What appear to be X-inefficiencies are actually maximizing behaviors
best
76
explained in terms of property rights and transaction costs.

All of these criticisms are flawed because they either simply assume away the problem of X-inefficiency or are based on empirically

untenable assumptions.7 7 Take, for example, the claim that X-ineffi-

ciencies do not exist because those producing them are merely maximizing their total mix of output of leisure for themselves and
commodities for the market. Those who make such a claim are engaging in what economist Harvey Leibenstein, the developer of the concept of X-(in)efficiency, terms "bull's-eye painting."7s They are taking
a set of data and simply stating that any observed results are the
product of rational maximizing behavior. 79
Under this approach, firms are automatically efficient. This conclusion is true even if the work ethic and management patterns at the
firm produce a waste of resources, chronic absenteeism, slacking, and
shoddy products.8 0 The judgment that such a firm is engaging in effi73. E.g., Mark Crain & Asghar Zardkoohi, X-Inefficiency and NonpecuniaryRewards
in a Rent Seeking Society: A Neglected Issue in Property Rights Theory of the
Firm, 70 A. EcoN. REv. 784 (1980); David Schap, X-Inefficiency in a Rent Seeking Society: A GraphicalAnalysis, 25 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus. 19 (1985). Rent seeking basically is the attempt to garner supranormal profits by obtaining monopoly
power, or convincing the government to grant it to you. Gordon Tullock, Rent
Seeking, in 4 ThE NEw PALGRAVEs DICrIONARY OF ECONO~Ics 147-49 (John

Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
74. E.g., E.C. Pasour Jr., Economic Efficiency and Inefficient Economies: Another
View, 4 J. PosT KEYNESiAN ECON. 454 (1982); George J. Stigler, The Xistence ofXEfficiency, 66 A. EcoN. REv. 213 (1976).
75. Thomas J. DiLorenzo, CorporateManagement,PropertyRights, and the X-istence
of X-inefficiency, 48 S. EcoN. J. 116 (1981).
76. Louis DeAlessi, PropertyRights, TransactionCosts, and X-Efficiency: An Essay
in Economic Theory, 73 AM. ECON. Rev. 64 (1983).
77. For a detailed and extensive rebuttal to the above criticisms, see FRANrZ, supra
note 70, at 183-200; Roger S. Frantz, Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Criticisms of X-Efficiency Theory and Literature, in STuDiEs iN ECONOMIC RATIONALrrY 43, 45-59
(Klaus Weiermair & Mark Perlman eds., 1990).
78. Harvey Leibenstein, On Bull's-Eye Painting Economics, 4 J. POST KEYNESIAN

EcON. 460, 461 (1982).
79. Id.
80. This situation prevailed at all too many American firms and production facilities,
at least in the 1970s and early 1980s. See generallyYoshi Tsurumi, Explaining
the JapaneseParadox,N.Y. TIms, Nov. 16, 1986, § 3, at 3 (arguing that Japanese management share in sacrifices for productivity but American executives do
not. American workers respond to this elitism with absenteeism and shoddy
workmanship.); Jeffrey L. Sheler, Why So Many Workers Lie Down on the Job,
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cient maximizing behavior is absurd, yet it is unavoidable because the
X-inefficiencies as leisure critique assumes that firms simply pick the
optimal balance between leisure and commodity production.S1
Another example of a critique based on unwarranted assumptions
is the claim that X-inefficiencies will be remedied by the incentives
provided to managers by the capital markets, i.e., the threat of a hostile takeover if efficiency and profits lag. Underlying this theory is an
assumption that the capital markets are perfect or perfectly efficient.8 2 As a general matter, the claim that some capital markets are
perfect is open to serious question.8 3 Even if we assume that some
markets are perfect, we still cannot simply postulate that pressure
from the capital markets will remove X-inefficiencies from firms.
First, the securities of many firms are not traded on large-scale public
markets, the only markets for which convincing evidence of efficiency
exists.8 4 Second, the assumption ignores the ability of incumbent
managers to frustrate the ability of outsiders to take over a firm
through internal devices such as poison pills and "golden parachutes"
or through legislation making takeovers much more difficult.85
The other theoretical critiques of the existence of X-inefficiencies
suffer from similar flaws.86 A few critics of X-(in)efficiency theory

have attempted to use empirical studies to rebut the idea that firms
suffer from X-inefficiencies. 8 7 These few empirical critiques of X-inefficiency theory have also failed to survive scrutiny.8 8
U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 6, 1981, at 71 (suggesting that job dissatisfaction affects millions of workers and costs employers billions of dollars each year
in absenteeism, reduced output, and shoddy workmanship).
81. For a more rigorous and exhaustive destruction of the x-inefficiency as leisure
production theory, see FRANrz, supranote 70, at 191-93; Frantz, supra note 77, at
51-53.
82. FAN'rz supra note 70, at 164-65; Frantz, supra note 77, at 53.
83. For a summary of the empirical studies challenging the efficient market hypothe-

84.

85.

86.
87.
88.

sis, see Victor L. Bernard et al., Challenges to the Efficient Market Hypothesis:
Limits to the Applicability of Fraud-on-the-MarketTheory, 73 NEB. L. REv. 781,
786-92 (1994).
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failureand the Economic Case for a Mandatory
DisclosureSystem, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 731 (1984). See also JAMEs D. Cox ET AL.,
SEcuiunxs REGULATION 40-41 (1991)(questioning the evidence of the efficient
market hypothesis as applied to securities traded on the over-the-counter market
or the securities of smaller issuers which are traded on securities exchanges).
Professor (and former SEC Commissioner) Joseph A. Grundfest concludes that
the confluence of management antitakeover tactics, state antitakeover laws, and
financial market developments has destroyed the unfriendly takeover wave and
effectively insulated inefficient management from the discipline of the capital
markets. Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A MinimalistStrategy for Dealing
With BarbariansInside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857, 858-64 (1993).
Frantz, supra note 77, at 45-48, 53-57; FRANrz, supra note 70, at 187, 196-99.
Frantz, supra note 77, at 57-58.
Id.
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In sum, theoretical and empirical examinations confirm what those
with a background in the business world realize: firms do have Xinefficiencies.S9 As economist Shlomo Maital put it, "[r]eaders with
experience in the business world may be bemused that economists
even question the existence of X-inefficiency. An entire branch of psychology, organizational behavior, is built on the assumption that Xinefficiency (the gap between actual and minimal costs) is alive and
well." 9 0
Next, it is necessary to turn to the issue of whether x-inefficiencies
are economically significant. How serious are losses caused by X-inefficiencies? A definitive answer cannot be supplied to that question because no large-scale studies on the topic have been performed.
However, based on small-scale studies, Professor Liebenstein has estimated that the X-inefficiency level for the United States economy as a
whole is approximately twenty percent. 9 ' In a multi-trillion dollar
economy this is a vast amount of waste that is certainly economically
significant. 92 Indeed, the losses from X-inefficiencies probably dwarf
any losses to the American economy caused by allocative
93
inefficiencies.
The existence of economically important X-inefficiencies does not
support the restoration of rivalry to a central role in antitrust law unless rivalry can play an important role in eliminating or reducing
those inefficiencies. Does rivalry play such a role? X-efficiency theory
has always presumed that rivalrous competitive pressures will tend to
reduce X-inefficiencies, although the pressures cannot guarantee those
results. 94 The link between rivalry and the reduction of X-inefficiencies is certainly intuitively credible.95 Does it exist in the real world?
Unfortunately, a definitive answer cannot be given. 96 A large-scale,
cross-longitudinal study of the issue is impossible to undertake.97
89. SCHERR & Ross, supra note 38, at 668; SHLoMO MArrAL, MINDs, M xrs AND
MoNEY 112-14 (1982).
90. MArrL, supra note 89, at 112.
91. Id. at 113 (citing Harvey Leibenstein, How Inefficiency Saps CorporateProfits,
FoRTuNE, June 19, 1978, at 209.).
92. MATrAL, supra note 89, at 113. Strangely, the aggregate amount of X-inefficiency

in the economy has not been challenged by microeconomically-oriented theorists.
Apparently they believe in a "fight them on the beaches" strategy of attempting to
prove that X-inefficiency does not exist at all.
93. Brodley, supra note 69, at 1027-28 (discussing theoretical reasons why the losses
from X-inefficiencies may vastly outweigh the losses from allocative inefficiencies); HARVEY LEMENSTEIN, BEYoND EcoNoMIc MAN 249-51 (1976).
94. LEMENSTEIN, supra note 93, at 207-08.
95. See Rex J. Ahdar, Antitrust Policy in New Zealand: The Beginningof a New Era,
9 INTL. TAx & Bus. LAw. 329, 343 (1992).

96. Id.
97. F.M. Scherer, Antitrust Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 998, 1004
(1987).
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Nonetheless, numerous small-scale studies have been consistent in
demonstrating that the presence of the pressures generated by rivalry
do tend to diminish the amount of X-inefficiencies in the firms subjected to those pressures.9 8 These studies do support the intuitive
view that rivalry can reduce X-inefficiencies and promote appreciable
improvements in overall economic efficiency.
B. How Rivalry Helps Spur Innovation and Innovative
Efficiency
Intuitively, rivalry would seem to spur firms to bring forth innovations to help them stay in front in the competitive race. 9 9 For a
number of years, however, some microeconomic theorists have challenged the proposition that rivalry breeds innovation and innovative
efficiency. These theorists claim, in fact, that strong rivalry actually
inhibits innovation. 0 0 If these assertions are correct, then promoting
rivalry through the antitrust laws might not be a sensible economic or
industrial policy.
The well-being of advanced industrial economies is, in large part,
dependent upon innovation and innovative efficiency.O1 This importance is described by Professor Brodley:
Innovation efficiency or technological progress is the single most important
factor in the growth of real output in the United States and the rest of the
industrialized world. Indeed, studies have shown that over the forty year period from the late 1920s to the late 1960s, at least half of the gain in10United
2
States output was due solely to technological and scientific progress.

Thus, a charge that rivalry inhibits innovation or innovative efficiency
is a very serious accusation. An examination of the theories which
suggest that rivalry inhibits innovation demonstrates, however, that
rivalry in fact assists innovation more than it retards it and that attempts in the real world to spur innovation by limiting rivalry are
likely to fail.
Two theories on how "excessive" rivalry hinders innovation have
been developed. The first theory is that rivalry (or competition) stymies innovation by diminishing a firm's ability to capture the rewards
of its innovations.-0 3 Innovation is often an expensive process, and

98. For a summary of studies indicating a link between lack of competition and Xinefficiencies, see SCHERER & Ross, supranote 38, at 668-72; FRAz, supra note
70, at 161-81.
99. This intuition is also reflected in Learned Hand's dictum that rivalry is a stimulant to "industrial progress." See supra text accompanying note 68.
100. See infra notes 103-08, 121-24 and accompanying text.
101. Brodley, supra note 69, at 1026.
102. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
103. See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation,and Antitrust,
in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIvENESS 47, 52-54 (Thomas M. Jorde &
David J. Teece eds., 1992).
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always an uncertain one. For each successful innovation, scores of expensive "dry holes" will have to be explored.104 In order for a private
firm to engage in innovation, it must believe that it will be able to
recapture the costs of innovation through enhanced future profits, or
in economic terms, it must be able to capture "economic rents" from
the innovation in the future.1 0 5 Unfortunately for many would-be innovators, innovations often have some of the characteristics of public
goods and profits from the innovation can be siphoned off by free-riding imitators.' 0 6 The greater the rivalry or competition in the marketplace, the more likely that free-riding imitators will siphon off the
profits. Furthermore, the presence of extensive competition or rivalry
in the market makes it less likely that the innovator will be able to
capture the "economic rents" arising from its innovation.1 0 7 Thus,
fierce competition in the market supposedly decreases innovation by
diminishing the incentive for private firms to engage in the process.
Empirical data exists which gives some modest support to this
theory.1OS
A closer examination of both the theory and the empirical evidence
supporting it reveals a much more complex relationship between rivalry (or competition) and incentives to innovate. On a theoretical
level, a number of factors, such as first mover advantage, brand loyalties, competitor inertia, and risk aversion may give an innovator the
ability to reap substantial profits from an innovation despite the
seeming inability to capture economic rents because of fierce competition.1 0 9 In addition, rivalry may promote the elimination of internal
104. Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize
Technology, 61 ANTurRUST L.J. 579, 581-82 (1993).
105. "Economic rents" are returns on an asset which are greater than the minimum
returns necessary to keep the asset in production. See G.L.S. SHAcKLE, ECONOMics FOR PLEASURE 116-17 (2d ed. 1968); ERwiN ESSER NEI~mRs, DITIONARY OF
BUsmNEss AiN EcONOMIcs 142 (3d ed. 1974).

106. Jorde & Teece, supra note 104, at 594.
107. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Antitrust: Source of Dynamic and
Static Inefficiencies?, in ANTrIRUST, INNOVATION AND CoiETrr"vNIss 82, 83-84
(Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992).
108. See, e.g., WIuhm L. BALDwIN & JoHN T. SCOTT, MAMET STRUCTRm AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 128-44 (1987); Edwin Mansfield, Composition ofR and D Expenditures: Relationship to Size of Firm, Concentrationand Innovative Output,
63 REv. ECON. & STAT. 610, 610-13 (1981); Richard C. Levin et al., R & D, Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure: New Evidence on Some
SchumpeterianHypotheses, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 20, 20-24 (1985).
109. MICHAEL E. PoRTER, TsE Coan'rmv ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 788 n.61 (1990).
First mover advantage is a "competitive advantage held by a firm by virtue of
being first in a particular market or first to use a particular strategy." OSTER,
supranote 32, at 364. Brand loyalty is "[a] consistent faithfulness in the choice of
a specific product over comparable products." Sonw & SmGEL, supra note 36, at
39.
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inefficiencies which hinder the ability of firms to profit from innovations they create. More important, the relationship between rivalry
and innovation is not linear. Instead, rivalry and competition strongly
enhance innovative efficiency, at least up to a certain point. At that
point, increases in rivalry or competition appear to decrease innovation, perhaps because of the process described above.11o
If we were omniscient beings, we might be able to discern exactly
where that magical point was for any given industry and adjust competition policy to produce the ideal amount of competition or rivalry to
optimize innovation. Unfortunately, with our bounded rationality and
incomplete information, we cannot fine tune public policy with that
degree of accuracy. Any policy we pursue is likely to produce too much
or too little rivalry to maximize innovative efficiency. The empirical
data indicates that it is more dangerous for innovation if we err on the
side of too little rivalry than if we err on the side of too much rivalry.111 This point is best made by economists F.M. Scherer and
David Ross who write "[w]hat is needed for rapid technical progress is

Competitor inertia simply refers to the tendency of organizations to "resist
innovation." DON HELLRIEGEL & JOHN W. SLOCUM, JR., ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 552

(2d ed. 1979). These tendencies are caused by a number of factors including threats to power and influence, organizational structure, limitations on
resources, and resources that are unable to be switched because they are commit-

ted to existing projects and interorganizational agreements, such as labor contracts and commitments to suppliers. Id. Risk aversion is preferring "asure
thing even when a risky thing is the better bet." MORTON HUNT,THE STORY OF
PSYCHOLOGY 547 (1993).
110. SCHERER &Ross, supranote 38, at 645-46. The relationship between competitive
pressures and innovations may also be explained by human behavioral psychology. For almost ninety years psychology has recognized what is known as the
Yerkes-Dodson Law. The Yerkes-Dodson Law "postulates an upside down Ushaped relationship between the quality of decision making and the pressures on
an individual/organization. Initially, the pressure improves the quality of decision making but after a point, additional pressure can lower the quality of decision making." Harinder Singh, Economic Behavior, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 203, 206 (V.S. Ramachandran ed., 1994). Competitive pressures may increase the ability of managers to make correct decisions on innovation but, if those pressures become too intense, the managers may start making
poor decisions resulting in a decrease in innovations. For an attempt to utilize
the Yerkes-Dodson Law to explain partial X-inefficiencies in firms, see HARVEY
OF HIERARCHY 18-20, 232
(1987).
111. P.A. Geroski, Innovation, Technological Opportunity, and Market Structure, 42
OxFoRD EcONOMIc PAPERS 586, 600 (1990). Cf Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 908
(1990) (Despite inefficiencies, rivalry produces more technological advances than
a regime in which development is controlled by one or a few sources.).
LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM: THE INEFFICIENCIES
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a subtle blend of competition and monopoly, with more emphasis in
general on the former than the latter...

"112

Cognitive psychology may provide an explanation of why it is better for innovation to err on the side of too much rivalry. Engaging in
innovation is a risky process. 1 13 Psychological studies have consistently indicated that a person's attitude toward risk under uncertain
conditions tends to be determined by how she frames her situation.114
If a decisionmaker frames her choice as an opportunity for gain, she
tends to be risk averse (risk avoiding). On the other hand, if she
frames her situation as one in which she is trying to avoid a certain
loss, she tends to be risk affinitive (risk preferring).1 35
In the absence of competition, a decision on whether to undertake
the research and development efforts necessary to create an innova112. SCHERER & Ross, supranote 38, at 660. The authors' conclusion is strongly buttressed by the recent empirical work of Professors Merges and Nelson who summarize their data in the following statement:
Public policy, including patent law, ought to encourage inventive rivalry,
and not hinder it. As the "race to invent" models show, a rivalrous structure surely has its inefficiencies. But such a structure does tend to generate rapid technical progress and seems a much better social bet than a
regime where only one or a few organizations control the development of
any given technology.
Merges & Nelson, supra note 111.
In a more recent essay, Merges and Nelson specifically apply their findings to
the antitrust laws. They write:
[O]ne question to ask about proposals for reform of antitrust law is
whether they would tend to unduly contract the number of capable and
motivated rivalrous sources of invention.... [Olur general message is to
be wary of arguments that say it is not important to preserve, or if need
be create, real rivalry in invention and innovation.
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, Market Structure and TechnicalAdvance:
The Role ofPatent Scope Decisions, in ANrrusT, INNoVATIoN Am CoETInrVNEss 185, 218 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992).
113. See Jorde & Teece, supra note 104.
114. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 457-58 (1981).
115. See, e.g., PAUL J.H. ScHOEmAF R, ExPERn NTs ON DECISIONS UNDER RISK: TH
EXPECTED UTrnrrY HYPOTHESIS 45-90, 109-25 (1980); John W. Payne et al., Behavioral Decision Research: Constructive Processing Perspective, 43 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 87, 95-97 (1992); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representationof Uncertainty,5 J. RISK & UNCERTA1rr
297 (1992); Don N. MacDonald & Jerry L. Wall, An Experimental Study of the
Allais Paradox Over Losses: Some PreliminaryEvidence, 28 Q.J. Bus. & ECON.
43 (1989); Dan J. Laughhunn et al., ManagerialRisk Preferencesfor Below-Target Returns, 26 MGwrr. ScL 1238, 1247-49 (1980). But see N.S. Fagley & Paul M.
Miller, The Effects ofDecision Framingon Choice ofRisky vs. Certain Options, 39
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & Hmi. DECISION PROCESSES 264 (1987) (empirical results suggesting that subjects avoid risk in situations when attempting to avoid
near certain loss). For a comprehensive review of studies and the impact of those
studies on the discipline of economics, see generally Lola L. Lopes, Psychology
and Economics: Pespectiveson Risk, Cooperation,and the Marketplace, 45 ANN.
REv. PSYCHOL. 197, 199-205 (1994).
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tion is likely to be framed as an opportunity for gain. Therefore, the
managers making the decision are more likely to be risk averse and
hesitant to "take the plunge" into innovation through research and
development. In contrast, in a market characterized by fierce competition and rivalry, managers may well frame the decision to commit to
a research and development program as necessary to avoid a loss.
They may reason that if they do not innovate, at least one of their
many fierce rivals will, and their firm will suffer a loss by not innovating.1 16 Thus, the managers in an atmosphere of fierce competition

and rivalry will tend to be more risk affinitive and more willing to
undertake the risks of the innovative process.
The other economic theory which suggests that rivalry is injurious
to innovation is what Professor Kitch has termed "prospect theory."117
Those who subscribe to this theory hypothesize that innovations form
a common pool, much like a fishing hole.138 A limited number of inventions exist. As a firm discovers an invention it decreases the total
available to other firms. This encourages firms to "race" for inventions. This leads to "overfishing" and wasteful duplication of inventive
efforts.119

Professor Kitch has argued that prospect theory suggests that rivalry in innovation is economically inefficient and that nonrivalrous
control over innovation is superior.12 0 Kitch proposes the traditional
neoclassical solution for a common pool problem, assigning specific
property rights to the items in the pool.121 In effect, Kitch suggests

that rivalry for innovations be curbed and that innovations be controlled by a single source, or at least a limited number of sources.
Professor Kitch's thesis is flawed in several ways. First, he completely ignores the incentive effects of rivalry in pressuring firms to
116. The word "may" is used quite deliberately for two reasons. First, psychological

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

evidence is empirical and probabilistic, not hypothetical and determinative.
Hence, psychology does not deny the reality that some people who frame a situation as an opportunity for gain will be risk affinitive and some people who frame a
situation as avoiding a certain loss will still be risk averse. Second, the managers
may not believe that any danger exists in not innovating. They may believe that
the situation is one in which it is better for rival firms to take the risk while they
reap the benefits by free-riding and imitating the rivals' innovations. See
SHLOMO MAITAL & SmiARoNE L. MArrAL, EcONbMc GAuMs PEoPLE PLAY 88-91
(1984)(a game theory representation of the above reasoning). On the other hand,
the managers may indeed believe that if they do not pursue and take advantage
of innovation, one of their rivals will. For a theoretic game representation of this
reasoning, see id. at 86-88.
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
EcoN. 265, 266 (1977).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 285-86.
See id. at 275. For a critique of many of the underlying assumptions of this theory and a proposed solution, see Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 871-75.
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create innovations and in forcing them to eliminate the internal ineffi12 2
ciencies which prevent them from exploiting those innovations.
Second, the world of innovations which Professor Kitch describes
simply does not exist in many industries. In many industries, innovations are not discrete developments whose value is captured by the
first party to develop it. Instead, technical advance is what Professors
Merges and Nelson call "cumulative." In these industries, "today's advances build on and interact with many other features of existing
technology."1 2 3 Locking up technology in such industries by granting
strong property rights will slow rather than accelerate technological
advances in such industries.
Third, the empirical studies of Professors Merges and Nelson,
although anecdotal, give strong support to the notion that an atmosphere of rivalry is much more conducive to innovations than a regime
in which one or a few sources are given complete control over the development of innovations.1 2 4 Professor Kitch's prospect theory does
not rebut the observation that rivalry is good for innovation, let alone
justify placing restrictions on rivalry in the name of spurring
innovation.
In sum, the intuitive belief that rivalry spurs innovation is both
theoretically and empirically sound. While some economic theories
seek to challenge the correlation between rivalry and innovative efficiency, those theories are either empirically flawed or useless for formulating a real world policy which is apt to enhance the flow of
innovations. In terms of innovative efficiency, promoting strong rivalry is sound economic policy.
C. How Promoting Rivalry Helps Create Successful WorldClass Industries
Promoting rivalry is also sound economic policy because vigorous
domestic rivalry fuels the growth of world-class industries which are
122. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
123. Merges & Nelson, supra note 111, at 881 (footnote omitted). Of course, observers
can certainly differ as to whether an industry is indeed characterized by discrete
technologies whose economic rents must be appropriable to spur innovation or by
cumulative technologies where innovations must not be locked up and incentives
to rivalry must be maintained. Compare Anthony L. Clapes, Confessions of an
Amicus Curiae: Technophobia, Law, and Creativity in the Digital Arts, 19 U.
DAYTON L. Rlv. 903, 949-50, 962 (1994)(emphasizing the need to maintain the
lure of profits as an incentive to innovate in high technology industries in general
and the computer software industry in particular) with Marshall Leaffer, Engineering Competitive Policy and Copyright Misuse, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1087,
1094-95 (1994)(arguing that the computer software industry is characterized by
cumulative technologies which must be open for exploitation if innovation is to
continue).
124. Merges & Nelson, supra note 111, at 877.
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able to compete and dominate in the global marketplace. The empirical studies of Professor Michael Porter of Harvard University's School
of Business Administration strongly support this contention.
In studying the industries in ten nations, Professor Porter found
that firms from particular nations tended to dominate industries or
industry segments.1 2 5 He identified four interrelated attributes or determinants which were key to establishing the dominance of various
nations in different industries. The four attributes Professor Porter
identified are:
1. Factorconditions. The nation's position in factors of production such as
skilled labor or infrastructure necessary to compete in a given industry.
2. Demand conditions. The nature of home demand for the industry's product or service.
3. Related and supportingindustries. The presence or absence in the nation
of supplier industries and related industries that are internationally
competitive.
4. Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry. The conditions in the nation governing how companies are
created, organized, and managed, and the na126
ture of domestic rivalry.

While all four determinants work together in creating a competitive advantage for particular national industries, the presence of
strong domestic rivalry is the "first among equals" in Professor
Porter's hierarchy. 127 Vigorous domestic rivalry is not only important
as one of the determinants of national competitive advantage, but also
as a catalyst for the development of the other determinants.128
Professor Porter's research lends powerful support to the idea that
antitrust laws ought to be used to promote rivalry. The promotion of
domestic rivalry is vital to the competitive success of a nation's industries, and therefore to the economic well-being of that nation. Thus,
promoting domestic rivalry is sound economics. As Professor Porter
specifically recognizes, forceful enforcement of strong antitrust laws is
perhaps the most important tool governments have for facilitating the
creation of strong domestic rivalry.129
Professor Porter's view has not, however, gone unchallenged. Professor David J. Teece of the Haas School of Business at the University
of California at Berkley maintains that Professor Porter misreads his
own anecdotal data and overemphasizes the role of rivalry in spurring
dominant national industries.130 Professor Teece argues that cooper125. The nations Professor Porter studied were the United States, Japan, Germany,
Denmark, Italy, Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. PORTER, supra note 109, at 21.
126. Id. at 71 (footnote omitted).
127. ToM PETERs, LIBERATION MANAGEMENT 504 (1992).
128. See Porter, supra note 109, at 560.
129. Id. at 662-64.
130. David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Innovation, and Antitrust, 62 AN'rrrusT
L.J. 465, 471 n.21 (1994).
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ation among competitors is as important as rivalry among them to
produce innovation and economic progress.1S1
Professor Teece's criticism of Professor Porter's conclusions is
somewhat misplaced. Professor Teece recognizes that Professor
Porter does not endorse a world of unthinking and unremitting rivalry
in which every competitor refrains from doing anything which might
help a rival firm.' 3 2 Professor Porter, like Professor Teece, recognizes
that some cooperation among competitors is needed to build dominant
globally competitive industries. For example, Professor Teece emphasizes the need for cooperation among competitors in the area of information exchange for purposes such as standard setting and
benchmarking.133 Professor Porter likewise believes that information
exchanges are vital in building dominant competitively successful industries. He emphasizes that "the exchange and flow of information
about needs, techniques, and technology among buyers, suppliers, and
related industries" is necessary for the functioning of the determinants of competitive advantage.134
Thus, Professor Teece's quarrel with Porter is not based on the
idea that Porter totally ignores the need for some cooperation among
competitors. What underlies Professor Teece's criticism of Professor
Porter is that Professor Teece has a fundamentally different view of
the conditions which are necessary to spur innovation and industrial
advancement.
Professor Teece believes that in order to spur innovation and concomitant industrial advancement, the incentive for firms to innovate
and commercially exploit those innovations must be preserved to the
maximum extent possible. In Professor Teece's view, one of the greatest threats to the incentive to innovate is the inability to capture rents
from innovation because of imitation by free-riding rivals.135 While
Teece acknowledges the need for rivalry,13 6 he is concerned about its
potential for blunting incentives to innovate. Thus, for example,
Teece (and his collaborator, Professor Thomas M. Jorde) is willing to
tolerate agreements among competitors which "secure appropriability
and prevent free-riding and opportunistic behavior" with respect to innovations which cannot otherwise be protected under existing intellectual property law.'37
131. Id. Professor Teece does not, however, deny the point that rivalry is important to
innovation. He merely suggests that a blend of rivalry and cooperation is needed

to maximize innovation. Id.
132. Id. at 471.

133. Id. at 469-81.
134. PORTR, supra note 109, at 152-53. Professor Teece cites this passage in his recent article. Teece, supra note 130, at 471.

135. Jorde & Teece, supra note 103.

136. Teece, supra note 130, at 471 n.21, 472.
137. Jorde & Teece, supra note 104, at 617.
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Professor Porter does not deny that incentives to innovate are important.' 3 8 However, he suggests several reasons why strong rivalry
is not inconsistent with innovation. First, in imperfect markets, innovators can gain a significant competitive advantage in spite of firms
which imitate their innovations.3s 9 Second, he notes that rivalry creates a penalty for not innovating if others do so. Professor Porter's
research indicates that this penalty is at least as important as positive
incentives to innovate "because of the inertia and complacency of
many companies."140 Third, Professor Porter's theory suggests that
rivalry, because of its beneficial impact on the determinants of national competitive advantage, will put firms in a better position to exploit successfully any innovations they create.'41 Research by a
number of scholars indicates that bureaucratic sclerosis and other internal firm inefficiencies are frequently responsible for a failure to create innovations or profitably exploit those innovations which are
created.' 42 To the extent that rivalry curbs X-inefficiencies in
firms,143 it can serve to facilitate the creation and commercial exploitation of innovations.
Professor Porter's views on innovation differ in an even more fundamental way from Professor Teece's views. He does believe that
some incentives to innovate must be preserved in order to spur the
creation of innovations and technological advances. However, Porter
does not believe that the creator of an innovation must be able to
wring every last penny of profit from an innovation or completely
block competitors from obtaining any uncompensated benefits from
the innovation. First, such arrangements are unnecessary to create
incentives to innovate in light of the competitive advantages which
can stem from innovations and the threat of innovations by active rivals. Second, and even more fundamental, a system which completely
blocks competitors from obtaining unpaid-for benefits from a rival's
innovation or advance would, in the long run, reduce the total number
of innovations and technological advances. The total number would
be reduced because innovation is a cumulative process which is enhanced by the widespread diffusion of knowledge among competitors
and their ability to build upon and utilize earlier innovations created
by their rivals. A system which allows competitors to erect insurmountable barriers to the utilization of their advances by rivals would
138. PORTER, supra note 109.

139. Id.
140. Id. The psychology of risk-taking may explain the phenomenon observed by Pro-

fessor Porter. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
141. PORTER, supra note 109.
142. Geroski, supra note 111, at 587-88; SCHERER & Ross, supra note 38, at 652-54;
MORTON I. KAmIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, MARKET STRuCrRE AND INNOVATION

67-68 (1982).
143. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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hinder the diffusion of knowledge and experimentation so necessary to
the innovative process.144
When viewed in this light, Professor Teece's critique of Professor
Porter's theory is nothing more than a rehash of the traditional argument that rivalry is destructive of incentives to innovate. 1 45 Professor
Teece's critique suffers from all the weaknesses of that line of argument; the critique (a) ignores the valuable incentive effects of rivalry,
(b) cannot be the basis of a workable public policy, and (c) assumes a
world of discrete innovations which does not correspond to the cumulative nature of innovation in the real world.14 6 Moreover, Professor
Teece's critique is also inconsistent with his own recognition of the
importance of the free flow of information for innovation and the creation of world-class competitive industries.147 The view that firms
must be able to capture the lion's share of rewards from their advances and innovations is incompatible with the observation that industries, in order to be globally dominant, must be able to absorb and
utilize information about techniques and technology developed by
their competitors.
Professor Teece's criticism of Professor Porter's thesis is, in the
end, unconvincing. Professor Porter's fundamental point stands.
Strong domestic rivalry is vital to the creation of globally competitive
industries. The use of the antitrust laws to promote rivalry is, therefore, sound economic and industrial policy.
IV. THE DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES OF TAKING
RIVALRY SERIOUSLY
The restoration of rivalry to a central position in antitrust law will
have a strong impact on contemporary antitrust doctrine in a number
of areas. The restoration will be felt most profoundly in the area of
Section One of the Sherman Act.
144. Cf PoRTER, supranote 109, at 635 (noting that while some protection for intellectual property is a necessity, overly strong intellectual property protection locks
firms into yesterday's technologies and hinders the diffusion of know-how necessary for further innovations). In contrast, Professors Teece and Jorde's objection
to intellectual property protections for innovations is not that they hinder the
diffusion of knowledge, but that they are basically ineffectual in curbing freeriding. Jorde & Teece, supra note 104, at 583.
145. See supra notes 94-98, 103-08 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 103-16, 122-24 and accompanying text. In the high tech industries which are of particular concern to Teece, loss of innovation through "excess
rivalry" is particularly unlikely. In such industries, technological opportunities
are rich because the relevant science and knowledge bases move rapidly and
often unpredictably. In industries with these characteristics, empirical studies
tend to demonstrate that the appropriability of quasi-rents from innovation is not
diminished by "excessive rivalry." SCHERR & Ross, supra note 38, at 647.
147. See Teece, supra note 130, at 471.
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The primary tool for analyzing whether a restraint passes muster
under Section One of the Sherman Act is the Rule of Reason. Under
the Rule of Reason, a restraint of trade will violate Section One if its
anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive effects.148 If, as
this Article argues, rivalry is synonymous with competition, then, by
definition, a restraint which diminishes rivalry has anticompetitive
effects.
The preceding point may appear to be obvious or even simplistic.
Yet, it calls into question a number of contemporary trends in the interpretation of Section One of the Sherman Act. The doctrine which
would be most affected by a renewed emphasis on rivalry is the rule
articulated by many courts that in order to prevail on a Rule of Reason
an
claim, the plaintiff must show that the practice in question has 149
adverse impact on the price or total output of goods or services.
This rule is based on the notion that only the various forms of economic efficiency (or even more narrowly, allocative efficiency or output
itself) matter in antitrust law. This notion is, of course, totally inconsistent with an emphasis on competition defined as rivalry.
Requiring proof of an increase in price or a decrease in output as a
sine qua non for an injury to competition is justifiable only if the vast
majority of significant decreases in marketplace rivalry result in a discernable increase in price or decrease in output. A diminution in rivalry, however, is often reflected not so much in an immediate
increase in price or decrease in output, but in (a) an increase in internal inefficiencies (X-inefficiencies) within firms,15o (b) a decrease in innovations by firms, 1 5 1 or (c) an increase in managers' arrogance
toward customers and fellow employees.15 2 In the long term, these
phenomena will likely lead to increases in price (or price equivalent)
and decreases in output. These long-term effects may not manifest
themselves for an extended period of time. Requiring plaintiffs to establish an increase in price or decrease in output ignores this longterm adjustment period. During this period, managers of firms may
148. National Soc'y Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978);
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Stratmore v. Goodbody, 866 F.2d 189, 194 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989).
149. See, e.g., Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 1995); SCFC ILC,
Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 968 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2600 (1995); Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 996 F.2d
537, 547 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 388 (1993); Schachar v. American
Academy of Ophthalmology, 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989).
150. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. See also Joseph F. Brodley, PostChicago Economics and Workable Legal Policy, 63 ANrrrRusT L.J. 683, 687
(1995)(decrying the requirement of a demonstrated immediate impact on price on
the grounds that such a requirement ignores the losses to productive and innovative efficiency caused by anticompetitive practices).
151. BRENNER, supra note 38, at 62-66; Brodley, supra note 150, at 687-88.
152. LEIBENSTnN, supra note 93, at 207-08.
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take advantage of the shelter of diminished rivalry to allow X-inefficiencies to proliferate, to shirk innovations, or to be unresponsive to
customers and fellow employees, rather than to increase price or decrease output. Plaintiffs will not be able to demonstrate an adverse
impact on price or output even though diminution of rivalry in the
market has had a large impact on producers.
A renewed emphasis on rivalry will lead to the abandonment of socalled market power "screens" or "fflters."153 In a Rule of Reason
analysis, a court which uses a market power screen holds that a restraint of trade cannot harm competition unless the defendants, individually or jointly, possess a meaningful modicum of market power.' 5 4
The use of market power screens has proven most popular in the area
been willing
of vertical restraints of trade, although some courts have
to use them in cases of horizontal market restraints. 5 5
The requirement that plaintiffs establish the defendants' collective
market power is even less justifiable than the requirement that the
plaintiffs demonstrate an effect on price or output. First, the assertion
that only firms with market power can reduce output effectively is
open to question.' 5 6 Second, even if this assertion were true, it
wrongly equates competition with output rather than rivalry.'57 Rivalry can be injured even by firms without market power.
If an increased emphasis on rivalry will lead to decreased reliance
on or even abandonment of requirements of proof of adverse impact on
price, output, or market power, it will lead to an increased sensitivity
to the individual business strategies pursued by various firms. Rivalry is ultimately a psychological phenomenon which is felt in the
153. For information about market power screens and their justification, see generally
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 Tax. L. Rav. 1, 19-23 (1984).
(Market power analysis should come first, as those firms without market power
pose little threat. Those with significant market power may warrant per se
analysis.)
154. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 969 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995); Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d
311, 315-16 (8th Cir. 1986); Goss v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 789 F.2d 353, 355 (5th
Cir. 1986); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 220
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1033 (1987); General Leaseways, Inc. v.
National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1984); Graphic Prods.
Distribs. Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1983); Storer Cable
Communications, Inc. v. City of Montgomery, 826 F. Supp. 1338, 1357 (M.D. Ala.
1993), vacated, 866 F. Supp. 1376 (M.D. Ala. 1993)(departure from Rule of Reason must be based on economic effect, not formalistic line-drawing).
155. John DeQ. Briggs & Stephan Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Powerand Access (Part
), 32 AN'TrRUsr BuLL. 275, 285 (1987).
156. Easterbrook's suggestion of a market power filter is criticized in Richard S. Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to ProfessorEasterbrook, 63
Ta L. REv. 41, 79-82 (1984) and Robert Pitofsky, Comment: Antitrust in the
Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REv. 817, 825-27 (1987).
157. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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minds of marketplace firm managers. Direct proof of an adverse impact on rivalry would require probing the psyches of the managers of
firms-not a very feasible line of inquiry.
Fortunately, the amount of rivalry any firm produces in the marketplace can be estimated. The first step in estimating the amount of
rivalry a firm generates in the marketplace is realizing that without
rivals, there can be no rivalry.1 58 The amount of rivalry any given

firm produces in the market is largely determined by two variables,
the structure of the market and the business strategy the firm is
pursuing.
A restraint of trade in a market with few competitors is likely to
have a larger dampening effect on rivalry than an identical restraint
in a market with numerous effective competitors. 15 9 This principle is
well-recognized in antitrust jurisprudence, including Section One of
the Sherman Act.160 Even those who believe that only restrictions on
output matter in antitrust laws pay some homage to this principle.
Advocates of this position emphasize the need to establish the defendant's possession of market power to prove a violation. Market power is
easier to obtain and prove when there is a relatively small number of
competitors in the market.161
However, the amount of rivalry generated by a firm is determined
by its individual business strategy as much as by the structure of the
markets in which it operates. 162 The role of business strategy has,
however, been unjustifiably ignored. A firm which pursues strategies
which merely imitate those of its competitors generates less rivalrous
pressure than a firm which pursues atypical business strategies. A
158. Cf John J. Flynn, Monopolization Under the Sherman Act: The Third Wave and
Beyond, 26 ANTrnmusT BuLL. 1, 62 (1981)(without competitors there can be no
competition).
159. Cf OSTER, supra note 32, at 211-13 (noting that the larger the number of competitors in an industry and the more similarly the top three or four rivals are sized,
the more rivalry and the fewer opportunities for coordination to reduce that
rivalry).
160. For example, the starting point for the analysis of the competitive effects of horizontal mergers under Section Seven of the Clayton Act is the effect of the merger
on concentration in the relevant markets. United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 503-05 (1974); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 343 (1962). In a Rule of Reason analysis under Section One of the Sherman
Act, courts often examine the competitive effects of a challenged restraint of trade
by looking at the effect of the restraint on "market structure including such factors as the number of firms and the market share of leading firms." ANTITusT
DEvELoPmENTs, supra note 2, at 48 (footnotes omitted).
161. See supra note 154.
162. Cf OsTER, supra note 32, at 214 (noting that diversity of firms tends to impede
coordination which diminishes rivalry); JosEPH L. BOWER, THE Two FACES OF
MANAGEMENT 183 (1983)(emphasizing the importance of individual business
strategy rather than the number of competitors in determining the competitiveness of a market).
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firm can choose from among a vast variety of uncommon business
strategies. The firm can be an aggressive discounter, or it can appeal
to the luxury end of a market. It can adopt an unusual channel of
distribution such as mail order sales in a market dominated by conventional retail outlets. The firm can make large expenditures in conventional research and new product development, or it can explore
unusual paths in research and development. In terms of generating
rivalry, the details of the strategy are not as important as its differentiation from the strategies adopted by competing firms. That differentiation is the engine which generates significant rivalry.
When a restraint of trade causes a firm to abandon a differentiated
business strategy, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, that restraint
is likely to do substantial harm to the rivalry which is the essence of
competition.163 Antitrust courts should recognize the importance of
preserving asymmetrical business strategies for fostering competition.
In recent years, antitrust courts have not been sufficiently sensitive to
the need to preserve atypical business strategies and have instead focused exclusively on market structure and neoclassical microeconomic
theory.164
The Tenth Circuit's decision in SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa, USA,
Inc. 165 is an example of this focus on market structure and
microeconomics theory. This case involved an attempt by Sears Roebuck, owner of the Discover credit card, to issue a card through the
Visa system. The Visa system is a major credit card system made up
of individual financial institutions who are the actual issuers of Visa
cards to consumers. Sears had obtained control of a bank through
which they sought to issue a Visa card. The other member banks of
the Visa system blocked Sears from issuing a Visa card by adopting a
bylaw of the system which precluded issuers of competing credit cards
from joining the Visa system and issuing a Visa card. Sears brought
suit against Visa claiming the bylaw was an unreasonable restraint of
trade which violated Section One of the Sherman Act. A jury verdict
was rendered for Sears, but that verdict was overturned by the Tenth
1 66
Circuit on appeal.
In reversing the verdict, the Tenth Circuit held that Sears had not
presented enough evidence to the jury to allow it to find that the challenged bylaw had, on balance, an anticompetitive effect.167 The court
noted that while the Visa venture might have a degree of market
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

cf MICHAEL E. PoRTER, COAnmTrrvE STRATEGY: TECINIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND ColPzE'rrOas 19 (1980)(noting that competitors with diverse strategies increase the intensity of rivalry).
See infra notes 165-204.
36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995).
Id. at 960.
Id. at 968.
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power, all parties stipulated that the relevant market was the system
of individual financial institutions which issued the various credit
cards under the Visa label.168 No individual financial institution possessed market power.1 6 9 The Tenth Circuit then proceeded to utilize a
market power screen and hold that Sears did not establish that the
challenged bylaw had an anticompetitive effect (i.e., increase price or
the defendant lacked market power in the
decrease output) 1because
70
relevant market.
The court bolstered its conclusion by pointing out that a wide variety of rates and terms for Visa cards was available from other banks
and financial institutions and that the bylaw did not prohibit Sears
from offering a non-Visa credit card, such as its own Discover card,
with any rates or terms it chose. 171 The court dismissed as irrelevant
evidence presented by Sears that a Visa card issued by Sears would
offer consumers a low-cost alternative to existing Visa cards and that
the financial institutions voting in favor of the challenged bylaw
issuance of a Visa card by Sears would undermine their
feared that
profits.172
If the court took the concept of competition as rivalry seriously and
emphasized the importance of business strategy in producing rivalry,
it might have reached a different conclusion. If competition is given
its proper meaning as rivalry, market power screens are inappropriate.17 3 The court's alternate grounds for determining that an an-

ticompetitive effect had not been shown are equally inapposite
because they show insensitivity to the importance of divergent business strategies.
From a purely structural and even personal perspective, the court's
holding is readily understandable. Most economists believe that the
market for credit cards has all the structural characteristics of a competitive market.174 Moreover, if the judges were like most other middle to upper income Americans, they were probably deluged with
offers for Visas and Mastercards offering a wide variety of interest
rates and ancillary features.175 On the other hand, if Sears' business
strategy is factored into the calculations, then the challenged bylaws
168. Id. at 967.
169. Id.

170. Id. at 969.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 971-72.
Id. at 969-70.
See supra notes 17-62 and accompanying text.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS ON U.S.

CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY-CoMP.T1TIVE DEVELOPMENTS 20-22 (1994).
175. Louis Trager, The Credit Game, Dollars and Sense, The Right Deal for Every

Kind of Spender? It's in the Cards, SAN FRANcisco EXAMINER, October 31, 1994,

at B-1.
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might well have had a major dampening effect on rivalrous competition in the credit card issuer market.
If Sears issued a Visa card, it would likely have incorporated many
of the features which were found in its Discover card, i.e., no annual
fee, an average annual percentage rate of interest which decreased as
purchases with the card increased, and cash rebates for use of the
card.176 As the Tenth Circuit implied, some or all of these features
may have already been available through issuers of various Visa
cards. 177 However, no evidence was presented that this combination
of features was available through an existing Visa issuer. Moreover,
even if such a combination were available, it was not available in a
Visa card aggressively marketed to a wide national audience of credit
card users. Sears, in making an unusual and desirable combination of
terms and rates available nationwide to a wide base of consumers,
would have been pursuing a divergent business strategy. That strategy would probably have greatly increased competition in the form of
rivalry in the market for Visa credit cards and would even have affected the price of credit. The increase in rivalry is possible because
millions of consumers are apparently not taking advantage of the competitive structure of the market. These consumers spend literally billions of dollars on cards which charge them higher rates of interest or
add auxiliary charges such as annual fees, when they could easily
cards with lower rates of interest and without
qualify for and obtain
auxiliary charges. 178
The reaction of existing Visa issuers to Sears' threatened entry is
some evidence that this effect would have occurred. Visa issuers were
deeply afraid that if Sears were allowed to issue a Visa card, their
profit margins would be eroded substantially.17 9 At least one existing
issuer also complained that because Sears faced fewer regulatory constraints, it could undercut the issuer by offering a lower rate of interest on its Visa cards.1so The court of appeals dismissed this evidence
on the grounds that the intent of those adopting the bylaw was irrele176. Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of Credit Card
Networks, 63 AINrIRUST L.J. 643, 662-63 (1995). The no annual fee provision

would be of particular importance to the subgroup of credit card users whom
Louis Trager calls "zero balancers--those who carry no interest-generating balances on their credit cards by paying off their balances in full by the end of the
back end free ride period. Trager, supra note 175. The interest rebate feature
would be of particular interest to the subgroup of zero balancers who Trager

terms "Pay as You Go High Rollers"-zero balancers who run up substantial
monthly purchases on their credit cards. Id.

177. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 971-72 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995).
178. Trager, supra note 175.
179. Carlton & Frankel, supra note 176, at 663.
180. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 968-70 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995).
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vant and that businesses generally do not like their competitors or
competition itself.18 1 The court missed a traditional and rather obvious point. While the intent of those adopting a restraint is not determinative of its legality, that intent is relevant to assist in predicting
the competitive effects of the restraint.1 8 2 In this case, the reaction of
competitors to Sears' pending entry into the Visa card arena indicated
that they believed that Sears' entry, coupled with its likely business
strategy, would increase rivalry/competition in that market.
The area of vertical restraints of trade is particularly rife for a renewed appreciation of the importance of maintaining divergent business strategies in fostering a competitive market. Asymmetrical
business strategies such as aggressive price discounting or utilization
of alternative channels of distribution are vital to the creation of
rivalrous competition. Contemporary antitrust courts frequently have
been oblivious to this reality.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer
Inc.183 demonstrates this weakness. The case involved the termina-

tion by Apple Computer of several of its dealers for violating Apple's
ban on mail order sales of Apple Computers. O.S.C. and five other
dealers brought suit against Apple, claiming that its ban on mail order
sales violated Section One of the Sherman Act. The district court
and the Ninth Circuit
granted summary judgment in favor of Apple
84
upheld the grant of summary judgment.'
In order to prove a violation of Section One of the Sherman Act,

concerted action must be demonstrated.18 5 The court of appeals held
that O.S.C. and its fellow plaintiffs had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Apple, in terminating the mail order dealers, had
acted in concert with any other party.' 8 6 Thus, the court held that the
trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the plaintiffs'
claim that Apple's actions violated Section One of the Sherman Act.187
This should have ended the court's inquiry. Nonetheless, the court
proceeded to discuss why the plaintiffs did not have a claim under Section One using a Rule of Reason analysis.
181. Id. at 969-70.
182. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); LAWREMNCE A. SULUVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST 175-79 (1977); ANrITRUST DEVELOP-

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Emzrrs, supra note 2, at 56. But see Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2597 (1993) (Robinson-Patman Act case rejecting
probative value of defendant's subjective estimates of ability to recoup losses sustained in alleged predatory pricing scheme in light of realities of market
conditions).
792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1466.
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer Inc., 792 F.2d 1464, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1466.
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The court emphasized Apple's need to eliminate free-riding
through its ban on mail order sales.1ss Apple feared that computer

buyers would go to full service retail outlets to learn about Apple personal computers, then purchase an Apple computer from a mail order
outlet which did not have to bear the cost of familiarizing the customer with Apple computers (or computers in general). The court also
noted that the number of retail outlets selling Apple computers increased after the mail order ban went into effect, and the price of Apple computers decreased.189
The result in the case might be correct. Aside from any lack of
concerted action, the justification that the restraint strengthened Apple and interbrand competition by eliminating free-riding had particularly strong appeal in this case. The sale of personal computers
(especially in the era when the facts of the case arose) requires tremendous point of sales efforts to educate customers and to overcome
their fear of technology and computers.' 9 0 These efforts were subject
to free-riding by mail order dealers.191 Moreover, Apple faced stiff interbrand competition from IBM personal computers and their compatible clones. Nevertheless, the court might have been too hasty in
equating the increase in the number of outlets and decrease in the
price of Apple personal computers with an increase in competition in
the market for personal computers.
O.S.C. and its fellow mail order firms were pursuing at least two
divergent business strategies. First, by utilizing mail order sales they
were providing an alternative channel of distribution, thereby creat92
ing what Joseph Palamountain has termed "intertype competition."'
93
The first
Second, they were pursuing a discount pricing strategy.'
strategy was, of course, ruled out by Apple's ban on mail order sales.
While the second strategy was not precluded by the ban on mail order
sales, no evidence was presented which indicated that any conventional Apple retailers were engaging in aggressive price discounting.
The price of Apple computers did drop after the ban on mail order
sales was instituted. The drop in price may not, however, have been a
result of enhanced competition among Apple retailers, but a manifes188. Id. at 1468.
189. Id. at 1469.
190. David F. Shores, Vertical Price-Fixingand the Contract Conundrum: Beyond
Monsanto, 54 FoRDHAm L. REv. 377, 400-01 (1985); Terry Calvani & Andrew G.
Berg, Resale PriceMaintenance After Monsanto: A Doctrine Still at War With
Itself, 1984 Duz L.J. 1163, 1182 n.69.

191. Mail order dealers did not have to offer extensive customer familiarization and
point of sales advertising. Thus, they were able to offer lower prices on the computers, undercutting ordinary dealers by free-riding on the costly point of sales
service and familiarization provided to customers. See supra note 190.
192. JOSEPH C. PAz oUNTAnq, Tm POUrTcs OF DISTBUTiON 38-39 (1955).
193. O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer Inc., 792 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1986).
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tation of the general decline in the price of personal computers stemming from rapid technological development over the last fifteen
years. 19 4 The increased number of Apple dealers is also not necessarily an indication of heightened competition. The increase in the
number of dealers would not add to competition if they were all following the same business strategy sheltered from alternative channels of
distribution and aggressive price discounting. Indeed, the increased
number of retailers might even be a sign that competition has decreased in the market.19 5
The elimination of an alternative channel of distribution and aggressive discounting in a product which was extensively protected by
patents and copyrights and which commanded fierce brand loyalty
may have eliminated a meaningful amount of rivalrous competition in
the market for personal computers. If the court were more sensitive to
the importance of divergent business strategies in promoting competition, it might have reached a different conclusion, or, at the very least,
relied solely on the lack of concerted action in upholding the grant of
summary judgment.
While the greatest impact on a renewed emphasis on rivalry will
be felt in Section One of the Sherman Act, legal analysis under other
provisions of the federal antitrust laws will also be affected. One such
area is the analysis of horizontal mergers under Section Seven of the
Clayton Act.196 Courts often assess ease of entry into the marketplace
when ruling on the legality of horizontal mergers under the Clayton
Act.
A court which takes rivalry seriously might well not blithely rely
on theoretical ease of entry to determine that mergers, including
mergers which create monopolies, do not threaten an injury to competition.' 9 7 A merger which leaves few competitors, or worse, leaves
only one competitor actually in the market, eliminates most, if not all,
salient rivalry. Of course, potential new entrants to the market might
supply a sufficient quantity of competition. However, as Michael
194. As each new generation of computers emerges, price drops of ten to twenty percent per year are the norm with substantially larger drops occurring during periodic price wars. Wayne Labs, PC Prices: How Low Can They Go,
INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROL Sys., Apr. 1993, at 27; Kathy Robello & Stephanie
Anderson Forrest, They're Slashing as Fast as They Can, Bus. WEE., Feb. 17,
1992, at 40.
195. See BoPnn, supranote 14, at 45-46 (noting that cartels and price fixing agreements
tend to draw more firms into a business).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). A horizontal merger is a merger between competitors "performing similar functions in the production or sale of comparable goods or services." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962).
197. Some cases which have exhibited this fault are United States v. Baker Hughes,
Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659
(9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir.
1984); and In re Echlin Mfg., 105 F.T.C. 410 (1985).
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Porter has found, all rivalry is not fungible. Professor Porter's studies
indicate that strong domestic rivalry is more important in fostering
world-class competitive industries than foreign competition.19 s The
principle which underlies Professor Porter's observation is that rivals
who are proximately located generate more competitive pressure than
rivals who are more distant.
The courts which rely solely on theoretical ease of entry to assume
that a merger will not seriously damage competition in a relevant
market ignore this lesson. A court which appreciates the importance
of strong domestic rivalry would insist on something more than the
theoretical absence of entry barriers, e.g., a demonstrated history of
effective and successful new entry into the market, to establish that a
merger will not injure competition in a relevant market.199 As long as
the would-be entrants in a market remain only potential competitors,
the psychological pressure they generate, i.e., the rivalrous competition, will not be as strong as that generated by firms that are already
in the market.
Another example of how paying attention to rivalry would make an
important difference in the analysis of horizontal mergers under Section Seven of the Clayton Act is the issue of acquisition of competitors
who are innovators or disrupters in the marketplace. In United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America,200 the Supreme Court held that Alcoa's
acquisition of Rome Cable, a small competing wire and cable maker,
violated Section Seven of the Clayton Act.201 Rome Cable was an innovator and aggressive competitor in the wire and cable market.202
The Court emphasized this point in determining that the merger
threatened competition in that particular market. 2o3 The Department of Justice's 1968 merger guidelines incorporated this point when
they stated that a departmental challenge to an acquisition involving
a disruptive or innovative competitor in a relevant market "can ordinarily be anticipated."204
In 1982 the Department's merger guidelines were rewritten. The
1982 merger guidelines demoted the acquisition of a disruptive competitor from an event that would likely trigger a Clayton Act Section
198. PORTER, supra note 109, at 117-18.

199. In Syufy, an existing theater chain did in fact move up into the Las Vegas theater
market, reducing the defendant's share of revenues from 93% to 75%. However,

whether this was effective entry is another question because the parties stipulated that the other chain was not an "effective" competitor. United States v.

Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 665 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990).
200. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).

201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 281.
Id.
Id.
United States Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines § 8 (1968), reprintedin
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 13,101 (1995).
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Seven challenge to an event which, in close cases, merely made it more
likely that the Department would challenge a merger. 20 5 Moreover,
this would only be a factor in cases where the nature of the market
was such that the elimination of a single disruptive competitor would
plausibly have an adverse impact on competition. 20 6 The 1984 revision of the 1982 merger guidelines continued the 1982 treatment of
the acquisition of a disruptive competitor. 20 7 In 1992 the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued new joint Horizontal Merger Guidelines.208 These new guidelines devalued the seriousness of the acquisition of a disruptive competitor even more. The
1992 guidelines state that the acquisition of a disruptive competitor is
merely a factor which makes "coordinated interaction," i.e., collusion,
among firms more likely and thus is a potential anticompetitive effect
9
of a merger. 20
The various versions of the merger guidelines represent a steady
depreciation of the competitive significance of the acquisition of disruptive competitors. This devaluation may be nothing more than a
reflection of the infrequency with which enforcement agencies and
courts have relied on this factor to attack or condemn mergers. 2 10 The
infrequent reliance on the acquisition of disruptive competitors to
block or unravel mergers may, in turn, be caused by a lack of such
acquisitions in the real world211

If this is true, then the apparent increase in tolerance for the acquisition of disruptive competitors may be little more than symbolic.
Nonetheless, the watering down of the perceived anticompetitive gravity of acquisitions of disruptive competitors is unfortunate because it
sends the wrong message to firms in the marketplace. Market disrupters provide rivalrous competition greatly disproportionate to their
size or number. These market disrupters provide the diversity of business strategy which constantly pressures the managers of other firms
and refreshes competition in the market. Their disappearance,
through means other than failure on the merits of their product or
service, usually results in a serious diminution of rivalry in the market. Courts interpreting Section Seven of the Clayton Act should rec205. United States Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines § 111C2 (June 4, 1982),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,102 (1995).
206. Id.
207. United States Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines § 3.44(c) (June 14,
1984), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) S 13,103 (1995).
208. United States Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal
Merger Guidelines § 2.11 (April 2, 1992), reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T
13,104 (1995).
209. Id.
210. Jay Greenfield, Beyond Herfendahl: Non-Structural Elements of Merger Analysis, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 229, 243 (1984).

211. Id. Jay Greenfield speculates that maverick market disrupters may be more unwilling to be acquired than other firms. Id.
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ognize this reality and give little leeway to acquisitions of disruptive
competitors, even if such acquisitions are rare and appear to be systemically unimportant.
While a restoration of the promotion of rivalry as a central concept
in antitrust law will result in a number of major changes in contemporary antitrust doctrine and the outcome of cases brought under the
antitrust laws, that restoration cannot and should not be grounded on
a monomaniacal devotion to rivalry. To carry through on this Article's
earlier analogy to a restored monarchy, rivalry must remedy its past
excesses and compromise with the new political realities which arose
during its period of exile. The changes which should and must be
made are the subject of the next section of this Article.
V. REFORM AND COMPROMISE
A.

Reforms-Differentiating Between Injury to Competitors
(Rivals) and Injury to Competition (Rivalry)Adoption of a Concept of De Minimis Injury to
Rivalry

If rivalry is to remain a viable organizing concept in antitrust law,
a distinction must be drawn between injury to rivalry and injury to
rivals. This idea should not be a shocking proposition to even the most
zealous proponents of rivalry. After all, it was the populist-oriented
Warren Court which, summarizing the equally populist legislative
history of the Cellar-Kefauver Act, first stated that the antitrust laws
protect "competition, not competitors."212
The distinction is important to draw for two reasons. First, if no
distinction is drawn, the line between state unfair trade practice law
and federal antitrust law will be eradicated. A successful unfair trade
practice directed against a competitor, by definition, injures that competitor. If such an injury is automatically equated with an injury to
competition, then every effective unfair trade practice injures the competition which is supposed to be the central concern of the federal antitrust laws. Counsel for competitors injured by unfair trade practices
could bring a federal antitrust action on the basis that "competition"
has been injured by the challenged act. The lure of bringing a federal
antitrust action is the availability of treble damages and attorney's
fees under the federal antitrust laws. This would result in the federal
courts facing a flood of cases currently brought in state court. As a
practical matter, the availability of federal antitrust remedies would
render state unfair trade practice claims and remedies superfluous
and subsume most of that body of law under the umbrella of the federal antitrust laws. As a number of courts have pointed out, this re212. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
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suit is neither desirable nor within the intent of Congress in passing
the federal antitrust laws.2 1 3 Second, the distinction is important be-

cause rivals can be injured without any injury to rivalrous competition. Indeed, if one rival injures or even destroys another through
competition on the merits of its product or service, rivalrous competition as a process has been validated, not injured.
The adoption of a concept of de minimis injury to rivalry would
seem to be a separate "reform," but in fact, it is inextricably linked to
separating injuries to rivalry from injuries to rivals.214 A distinction

between injury to rivals and injury to rivalry is not workable without
a concept of de minimis injury to rivalry. Any injury to a rival injures
rivalry to some extent. Assume, for example, that two firms are vying
for a contract. One firm conspires with a legally independent party to
spread disparaging falsehoods about its competitor. The falsehoods
are believed by the firm awarding the contract and the contract goes to
the rival who disseminated the false information. No other contracts
are affected and the firms remain bitter rivals for other business.
What the winning firm did certainly constituted a tort.2 15 Because of
the disparagement, the managers of the victorious firm probably felt
less psychological pressure to be responsive to the needs of the firm
awarding the contract. In some sense rivalry is diminished. If competition is equated with rivalry, a violation of Section One of the Sher213. See, e.g., Military Servs. Realty, Inc. v. Realty Consultants of Virginia, 823 F.2d
829, 832 n.4 (4th Cir. 1987); Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 655 (7th
Cir. 1984); Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 90 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Merkle Press, Inc. v. Merkle, 519 F.
Supp. 50, 54 (D. Md. 1981).
214. The use of the term "reform" in the text is not meant to imply that modem day
antitrust courts provide remedies for insubstantial injuries to competition. Indeed, many antitrust courts (including the Supreme Court) have already articulated the view that the antitrust laws are not concerned with trivial,
insignificant, or de minimis injuries to competition. E.g., United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Doctors Steuer & Latham v. National Medical Enters., 672 F.
Supp. 1489, 1504 (D.S.C. 1987); United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters,
536 F. Supp. 149, 158 (D.D.C. 1982). The term "reform" is merely meant to reject
the extreme, albeit logical, implication of restoring rivalry to a central place in
antitrust law-any diminution of rivalry violates the antitrust laws. Such an
approach would rule out, for example, developments such as the merger of small
rivals in a market overflowing with vigorously competing firms or the sharing of
technological know-how among competitors because these actions, to some small
degree, diminish the rivalry between the parties to the arrangement. Applying
federal antitrust law in such instances would not only be overkill, but would, in
the long run, hinder both economic efficiency and rivalry.
215. For information on the tort of commercial disparagement, see generally 2 FOWLER
V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAw OF TORTs §§ 6.1-6.4 (2d ed. 1986); W. PAGE KEETON ur
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF ToRTs 962-77 (5th ed. 1984); 2 RUDOLPH
CALLmANN, TE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES

§§ 11.01-11.35 (4th ed. 1994).
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man Act may have occurred. Legally independent parties have
restrained transactions (created a restraint of trade) which has injured "competition." Moreover, the restraint has no conceivable
procompetitive or other justifications. 216 Nonetheless, this hardly
seems like the case for the imposition of federal antitrust liability because any successful business tort is apt to diminish rivalry at least to
the extent described in the above example. Yet, the only way to escape
the "logic" of the conclusion that the antitrust laws have been violated
is to require that the diminution of rivalry reach a threshold of significance before it constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws.
The precise parameters of a significant injury to rivalry are not
easy to establish. In addition, tremendous variations may exist
among courts in judging whether an act or practice meaningfully injures competition. These difficulties are worth confronting because
the alternatives are unacceptable. One alternative is to simply abandon rivalry as the defining concept for competition. This is both bad
law and bad economic policy. Moreover, substituting output or any
form of economic efficiency for rivalry will engender similar problems.
Net output is often difficult to measure and sometimes even difficult to
deflne.217 Even if these concepts can be measured, some minimal
threshold injury to output/economic efficiency will still be needed to
avoid burdening the courts with trivial injuries that are really not the
concern of the antitrust laws.
Another alternative is to simply state that competition is injured
any time rivalry is diminished in any degree. Under this approach,
automatically allowing an antitrust suit for any injury to rivalry could
punish actors for pursuing rivalry and competing on the merits of
their products or services. Given the consequences of these alternatives, the task of ascertaining the boundaries of de minimis injuries to
competition is an onerous, but necessary task.
B. The Grand Compromise-Giving Economic Efficiency a
Co-Equal Role
Drawing a distinction between injuries to rivals and injuries to rivalry and establishing minimum thresholds of diminution of rivalry
are needed to make rivalry a viable central concept in antitrust law.
216. The spreading of false information is a deadweight social loss. RicHAPM A. PosNER, Tm EcoNinc ANALYSIS OF LAW 109-10 (4th ed. 1992); E. Thomas Sullivan,
On Nonprice Competition: An Economic and MarketingAnalysis, 45 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 771, 791 n.101 (1984). For an argument on how such tactics can, but not
necessarily do, injure competition, see Harry S. Gerla, FederalAntitrust Law and
the Flow of Consumer Information, 42 SYRACUSE L. R!v. 1029, 1052-80 (1991).
217. Cf Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 283-84
(1986) (discussing the ambiguities and limitations of measuring the concept of
output).
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In this sense, no inconsistency exists between these modifications and
rivalry.
Conceding that gains in various forms of economic efficiency can
offset losses in rivalry is a very different matter. By definition, allowing gains in economic efficiency to offset losses in rivalry places
rivalry in a subordinate role. Proponents of the centrality of rivalry
can argue that such a concession is unjustified as a matter of statutory
interpretation. 2 18 They can also point out that recognizing a direct
role for efficiency considerations is a form of "double counting." Economic efficiencies and other desirable social goods will be created if
rivalry is promoted. Finally, if economic efficiency can justify a diminution of rivalry, why shouldn't other values, such as the maintenance
of countervailing power, the preservation of small independent businesses, the spreading of economic opportunities to minorities, or the
diffusion of educational opportunities, be permitted to offset losses in
efficiency?
All of these points are analytically sound. The only response is
that concern with the various forms of economic efficiency is so entrenched in the courts, and perhaps in the mind of the public, that an
antitrust policy which does not directly address this concern would
lack the appearance of legitimacy it needs to be sustainable in the long
term. In recent years, both the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have continually emphasized the need to consider economic efficiency in gauging whether practices pass muster under the federal antitrust laws.219 A great deal of contemporary dissatisfaction with
traditionalist/populist antitrust doctrine stems from a belief that the
doctrine has hindered the ability of the United States to compete in a
global economy it no longer dominates. 2 20 The beliefs that rivalry impedes efficiency and that an antitrust policy based on the promotion of
rivalry hinders the global competitiveness of American industries are
perversely wrong.2 2 ' Nonetheless, faith in the need for promoting economic efficiencies is so strong that an antitrust policy which does not
recognize a direct role for claims of efficiencies probably will lack the
judicial and public support needed to make it effective.
Why should efficiency be promoted and not other values? The simple reason is that while other values have occasionally enjoyed judicial
recognition as being able to offset competition,2 22 they do not enjoy the
218. See supra notes 7-60 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 4, 45.
220. Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: Should Judges and Juries
Make It?, in ANwrRusT, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 29, 34-35 (Thomas M.
Jorde & David Teece eds., 1992).
221. See supra Part III.
222. See supra note 46.
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same widespread and persistent allegiance as efficiency. This answer
may not be principled, but it is pragmatic.
What then should be the role of economic efficiency in an antitrust
regime centered around rivalry? Efficiency should be granted
equivalent status with rivalry when it comes to weighing procompetitive effects. In other words, gains in the various forms of economic
efficiency should be considered benefits to competition. This stance
may not be justifiable as a matter of logic or statutory interpretation,
but it is practical politics. Those who urge that courts once again accept impact on rivalry as a vital consideration in the evaluation of an
act or practice under the antitrust laws already face a Herculean task.
Convincing courts to abandon their commitment to consider directly
economic efficiency under the antitrust laws is an impossible task.
While accepting a direct role for claims of economic efficiencies may
be a political necessity, such acceptance need not be uncritical. Speculative or theoretical claims of economic efficiencies should not be permitted to counterbalance demonstrated diminutions of rivalry.223
Unfortunately, the record of courts in taking a critical look at claims of
economic efficiencies has been far from encouraging. For example, in
the area of vertical non-price restraints of trade, courts have often unthinkingly accepted claims that the restraints will eliminate free-riding without enquiring whether a free-riding problem actually exists or
whether the challenged restraint will solve the problem.224 In the
area of horizontal mergers, courts, and sometimes even enforcement
agencies, have too often relied on theoretical ease of entry into a market to offset the anticompetitive effects of a merger, rather than insisting upon actual entry by competitors into the market.2 25
The spotty record of courts in critically evaluating claims of economic efficiencies ought not stand in the way of a compromise which
recognizes such efficiencies as coequals of rivalry. If a court is unwilling to evaluate the alleged economic efficiencies with a skeptical eye
and an open mind, it will probably be unwilling to accept the importance of rivalry in the antitrust laws. The grand compromise will do
no harm because furthering rivalry is already a lost cause in those
courts.

223. The approach used by the Department of Justice in its 1982 and 1984 merger
guidelines relating to efficiencies claims can serve as a model. The guidelines
adopt a skeptical attitude and demand clear and convincing proof that efficiencies
can offset the anticompetitive effects of a merger. Department of Justice, supra
note 205, § VA & n.53; Department of Justice, supra note 207, § 3.5.
224. See James F. Rill, Non-Price Vertical Restraints Since Sylvania: Market Conditions and Dual Distribution,52 AqrrRusT L.J. 95, 101 (1983).
225. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The decline in the primacy of rivalry as an antitrust value has been
continuing for almost a quarter of a century. Reversing that decline
will not be an easy task nor will rivalry ever assume the unique position it enjoyed prior to the 1970s. Changes and painful compromises
will have to be made. Nevertheless, the task is worth undertaking
and the changes and compromises are worth making because the
stakes are enormous.
Rivalry is vital to encourage managers to remove wasteful inefficiencies which cost producers and consumers billions of dollars each
year. 2 26 Perhaps even more important, the maintenance of strong do-

mestic rivalry is crucial to the development of industries which can
compete globally.227 Trillions of dollars, millions of jobs, and the standard of living of the nation ride on the development of such industries.
As Professor Porter has observed, vigorous enforcement of appropriate
antitrust laws is the most important policy governments can pursue to
promote that rivalry. 2 28 The size of these stakes should encourage

those who wish to see rivalry restored to undertake the difficult task
of convincing courts to take rivalry seriously, and to make the sometimes distasteful changes and compromises necessary to restore the
promotion of rivalry to its rightful place in antitrust law.

226. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
228. PORTER, supra note 109, at 662-64.

